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Nestled in its own corner of American Indian law, the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker2 
balancing test, also known as implied federal preemption, and its progeny have shaped the 
application of state tax laws within tribal lands for four decades.3 Under this test, a court balances 
federal, tribal, and state interests to determine whether a state’s taxing authority is impliedly 
preempted by federal law.4 The Bracker balancing test is confined to state assertions of authority 
“over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”5 In a recent dissent, 
Chief Justice Roberts described the Bracker balancing test as “a nebulous balancing test,” which 
lacks rigidity and “mires state efforts to regulate on reservation lands in significant uncertainty, 
guaranteeing that many efforts will be deemed permissible only after extensive litigation, if at 
all.”6 Put simply, the present iteration of the Bracker balancing test is unworkable. 
This Article argues that the Bracker balancing test, in its current form, does not produce 
predictable outcomes. By examining decisions in which a court conducted the Bracker balancing 
test, we conclude that the test fails to provide clear guidance of its application, thus seeding 
unpredictability for tribes, states, and enterprises conducting business with tribes. We argue that 
after forty years, the Bracker balancing test must be remodeled to provide sorely needed clarity. 
Such a position is not, in and of itself, groundbreaking. Many tribal scholars have criticized the 
current Herculean task litigants face when Bracker is at issue and the resulting uncertainty for 
states, tribes, and tribal business partners.7 This Article departs from prior scholarship by 
examining data from lower federal and state court decisions. We analyze lower courts’ application 
of the Bracker balancing test since the test’s inception to identify how the lack of clarity has 
manifested in litigated controversies. 
“The power to tax is a fundamental, necessary sovereign power of government.”8 But 
identifying which sovereigns wield taxing powers in particular scenarios has produced decades of 
 
2 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (hereinafter “Bracker”).  
3 Although the Bracker balancing test has been employed for a variety of state assertions of authority, see generally, 
e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (rejecting the state’s attempt to regulate a tribe’s 
game hunting enterprise), this Article focuses solely on state taxation authority because most of the cases that 
conduct the Bracker balancing test address state taxing power. 
4 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142-45.  
5 Id. at 144. 
6 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2501 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
7 Alex Tallchief Skibine, From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law, 80 MONT. L. REV. 
67, 89-97 (2019); Anthony Broadman, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love Bracker, GALANDA BROADMAN 
(Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.galandabroadman.com/blog/2013/08/how-i-stopped-worrying-and-learned-to-love-
bracker [https://perma.cc/3L25-WX6A] (“[I]t seems every time courts apply the Bracker balancing test, it becomes 
erroneously less possible to pass.”); F. Michael Willis, Courts Side with Tribes in the First Tax Disputes Testing the 
Obama Administration Land Leasing Regulations, NATIVE AM. RESOURCE COMMITTEE (2016), 
https://www.hobbsstraus.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Michael-Willis-State-Taxation-and-the-Indian-Land-
Leasing-Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU2Y-38V8] (“Administering [the Bracker balancing test] adds a layer of 
legal uncertainty to an already challenging environment for economic development. . . . The result has been the loss 
of tribally generated revenues to those outside jurisdictions, legal uncertainty that stifles economic development in 
tribal communities, and frequent resort to litigation.”); John Hayden Dossett, Indian Country and the Territory 
Clause: Washington’s Promise at the Framing, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 205, 274-75 (2018). 
8 Elster v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 590 (2019).  
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inconsistent outcomes in the lower courts.9 States’ power to tax certain enterprises or activities on 
tribal lands potentially conflicts with the federal government’s interests in promoting tribal 
sovereignty and self-governance. The conditions under which state taxes are preempted by the 
Bracker balancing test remain unclear. The disparate outcomes in recent gaming cases are 
illustrative of such disparities.  
Many tribes own and operate gaming facilities.10 Instead of purchasing their own gaming 
equipment, some tribes lease equipment from non-Indian corporations.11 Some states have 
imposed ad valorem, or personal property, taxes on the non-Indian’s gaming equipment even 
though it is located only within tribal boundaries.12 When a state asserts taxation authority over a 
non-Indian on tribal land, the Bracker balancing test applies.13 Employing the Bracker balancing 
test, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state tax on the gaming equipment was preempted 
by federal law.14 Yet, the Second Circuit upheld the equivalent tax imposed by the State of 
Connecticut.15 Both courts applied the same test to like taxes on gaming equipment. Yet, the courts 
reached opposite results.16 
In October 2020, the Supreme Court had the occasion to review this Oklahoma Supreme 
Court decision, but denied certiorari.17 Justice Thomas dissented from this denial, arguing that the 
opposite holdings in the Oklahoma and Second Circuit decisions presented a “square conflict.”18 
He recognized that the Court had “an opportunity to clear up tensions among courts about how to 
apply pre-emption principles at the intersection of federal law, state law, and tribal land.”19 But 
with the denial of certiorari, “pre-emption law will remain amorphous.”20 Justice Thomas’s 
frustration with the denial puts him in good company.   
Many scholars lament how the Bracker balancing test has evolved from its original 
meaning.21 Several commentators have called on Congress fix the problem.22 Instead of adopting 
 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013); Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. 
Rogers Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr., 475 P.3d 824 (Okla. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 24 (2020).  
11 Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 459-60; Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 827. 
12 Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 459-60; Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 827. 
13 Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 471-73; Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 830-31. 
14 Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 834. 
15 Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 473-74. 
16 Compare Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 473-74, with Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 834. 
17 Rogers Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr. v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 141 S.Ct. 24, 24 (2020).  
18 Id. (Thomas, J. dissenting).  
19 Id. at 25.  
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX 
LAW. 897, 908-09 (2010); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 420-21, (2008); Jesse K. Martin, Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation: Undermining 
Indian Sovereignty Through State Taxation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 251, 265-66 (2006); 
Charley Carpenter, Preempting Indian Preemption: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 
639, 666-71 (1990); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 74-75 
(2008). 
22 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 21, at 17-19 (proposing federal legislation to explicitly restrict states’ powers to tax 




a legislative approach, this Article advocates that the judiciary maintain the Bracker framework. 
We examine the current utility of the Bracker balancing test to determine whether courts are in 
fact weighing tribal, federal, and state interests. We perform a statistical analysis of a dataset 
comprised of 59 lower court taxation opinions which conducted a Bracker balancing analysis. 
Specifically, we determine whether there are any factors that may explain why the majority of 
lower courts rule against tribal interests.  
First, this Article recounts the Supreme Court’s modern Indian law jurisprudence 
governing states’ regulation of tribes, their members, and their lands. Although this Article focuses 
on Bracker and its progeny, Bracker itself acknowledges that it fits within a broader progression 
of the Court’s recognition of state authority related to tribal business operations. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s opening line in the Bracker decision stated, “In this case we are once again called upon 
to consider the extent of state authority over the activities of non-Indians engaged in commerce on 
an Indian reservation.”23 To more fully consider the data set of 59 lower court opinions, we lay out 
a brief outline of implied preemption in this context. 
Second, we cross-tabulate the judicial finding of no preemption with key characteristics of 
the cases in the dataset. We then present the results of regression analyses24 which we employed 
to determine whether any factor explained why tribal interests lose tax challenges almost two-
thirds of the time. Contrary to expectations, there was no significant relationship between the 
passage of time and preemption case outcomes. Our models revealed that lower courts were less 
likely to find preemption of cigarette taxes but apt to find that state fuel taxes were preempted.  
Third, we explore the inconsistent decisions rendered by lower courts in their application 
of the Bracker balancing test. After identifying these incongruities in which courts render 
conflicting decisions, we present ways in which the judiciary can revise and clarify the Bracker 
balancing test in the hope of providing greater predictability and producing uniformity in the lower 
courts.  
 
II. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS AFFECTING NON-INDIANS ON TRIBAL LANDS 
 
 This Part chronicles Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence from Williams v. Lee25 in 
1959 to Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation26 in 2005. Conflicts between states and tribes 
significantly predate 1959.27 Three late nineteenth-century cases provide the context important to 
 
emphasizing the problem of judicial supremacy); see also Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and Sovereignty in 
Indian Affairs, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 307, 337 (2018) (proposing an Indian Sovereignty Affirmation Act). 
23 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137 (1980).  
24 Regression analysis is a statistical method used to describe the relationship between a dependent variable 
(outcome variable) and one or more independent variables (predictive or explanatory variables). 
25 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
26 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005). 
27 See e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Tribes] owe no allegiance to the states, and 
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are 
often their deadliest enemies.”); see also Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The 
Judicial Divesture of Indian Tribal Authority over Non-Members, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 8-16 (1999). 
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understanding the modern doctrine.28 Sometimes referred to as the “Non-Indian Lessee Cases,”29 
the Supreme Court upheld state taxation of non-Indian property within an Indian reservation when 
the state’s tax would not interfere with tribal treaty rights.30 But the modern doctrine blazed a trail 
that is distinct from the early Non-Indian Lessee Cases. 
 
A. The Pre-Bracker Legal Landscape 
 
 The Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence begins with Williams v. Lee.31 In Williams, a 
non-Indian operated a general store on the Navajo Indian Reservation and sold goods to a tribe 
member on credit.32 Seeking to collect the amount owed, the store owner brought suit against the 
tribe member in Arizona state court.33 The Supreme Court held:  
 
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would 
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence 
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial 
that [the store owner] is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the 
transaction with an Indian took place there.34 
 
The Williams Court stated, “Through conquest and treaties [Native American tribes] were 
induced to give up complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange for federal 
protection, aid, and grants of land.”35 Looking back to Chief Justice Marshall in 1832, the Court 
recognized the independent communities of native nations, their ownership of distinct lands, and 
their separation from the laws of the states where tribal lands are located.36 The essential question 
regarding a state’s jurisdiction, absent Congressional authorization, “has always been whether the 
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.”37 Williams generated two lines of cases: (1) those related to tribal governance and taxing 
authority and (2) those related to state authority.38 After we give a brief overview of tribal 
governance as it relates to tribal taxing powers, we focus on the cases pertaining to state authority.39  
 
28Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 33 (1885); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1898); Wagoner v. 
Evans, 170 U.S. 588, 592-93(1898). 
29 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 472 (2d Cir. 2013). 
30 Utah & N. Ry. Co., 116 U.S. at 33; Thomas, 169 U.S. at 274-75; Wagoner, 170 U.S. at 592-93. 
31 See Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (2011), 
for a comprehensive examination of the case’s history. 
32 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217, (1959).  
33 Id. at 218.  
34 Id. at 222. 
35 Id. at 218. 
36 Id. at 219.  
37 Id. at 220.  
38 Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, 40 HUM. RTS. 3, 5 (2015).  
39 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 
39 AM INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014); Jensen, supra note 21, for a much more thorough examination. See Rebecca 
Tsosie, Tribal Data Governance and Informational Privacy: Constructing “Indigenous Data Sovereignty,” 80 




1. Tribal Taxing Authority 
 
Williams affirmed the principle of tribal governance authority. Tribes are domestic, dependent 
sovereigns and retain their authority to govern. The tribal right to govern is aboriginal, not a 
creation of the Constitution, and, in fact, predates the Constitution.40 Although tribes retain a 
number of sovereign powers, like sovereign immunity and the power to exclude people from their 
lands,41 tribal sovereignty is diminished in a variety of ways.42 Setting aside other limitations or 
ambiguities regarding tribal authority, tribes clearly possess the power to tax members and 
nonmembers on Indian land.43 
Tribal taxing power is “an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary 
instrument of self-government and territorial management.”44 Taxation is an exercise of inherent 
tribal governmental power that “derives from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control 
economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services 
[by requiring those acting within the territory to contribute].”45 Tribes can develop any type of 
taxation scheme simply because taxation remains in their inherent sovereign powers.46 However, 
the federal government, as the dominant sovereign, can modify tribal sovereign authority.47  
 
2. Preemption of State Authority Relating to Tribes  
 
More relevant for our purposes is the percolation of state taxation authority into tribal 
affairs. Regarding state authority, Williams created the “infringement test,” which provided that 
unless Congress has legislated to the contrary, state governments cannot infringe on the internal 
affairs of tribal governance.48 Following Williams, the Supreme Court held that states may not tax 
transactions on tribal land involving tribal members nor the on-reservation income of tribal 
members.49 But a tribe’s off-reservation activity is subject to general taxation.50 Although the 
infringement test remains an independent basis for the invalidation of state action, the Bracker 
 
40 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).   
41 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (sovereign immunity); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1982) (power to exclude people from Indian land). 
42 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians) (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 
(1981) (creating the Montana test for limited tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians and the Montana test 
exceptions). 
43Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).  
44 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.   
45 Id.   
46 Jensen, supra note 21, at 23. 
47 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 435 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
48 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
49 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).  
50 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
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balancing test for implied preemption has mostly swallowed up any independent infringement 
analysis when the issue involves non-Indians.  
 
B. Foundations of Implied Preemption 
 
Notwithstanding that it is often called the Bracker balancing test, implied preemption 
analysis began fifteen years before Bracker with Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission.51  
In Warren, Arizona imposed a two percent transaction privilege tax on a non-Indian who 
was licensed by the federal government to conduct business on the Navajo Reservation.52 The 
Supreme Court examined the history and level of federal regulations of Indian traders and noted 
that the federal government largely allowed Indians to “govern themselves, free from state 
interference.”53 The Court struck down the tax as an intrusion into federal licensing and regulation 
of Indian traders on reservations and stated that Arizona had been relieved of any obligations to 
the Navajo Reservation because the federal government provided roads, education, and other 
services to the tribe.54 Simply put, federal regulation of Indian traders was pervasive, and Arizona 
did not possess any duties or responsibilities that would justify the tax.55 Following Warren 
Trading Post, the Court decided a series of cases regarding retail cigarette taxes. 
These retail cigarette cases require us to take a detour to examine the narrow subject of 
state taxation authority related to tribes and Indians themselves. In Moe v. Confederated Salish 
and Kootenai Tribes, the Supreme Court upheld the State of Montana’s retail tax on cigarettes sold 
by an Indian on tribal lands.56 Although the legal incidence of Montana’s tax fell on the consumer, 
the Indian seller collected the tax.57 The Supreme Court determined this collection requirement 
did not interfere with either federal interests or tribal self-government and was a minimal burden 
to collect a lawfully imposed tax.58 Thus, a state may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-
Indian consumers of Indian sellers doing business on tribal land, even if that tax is detrimental to 
the Indian seller’s business with non-Indians.59 
The Court built on this principle a few years later in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation (“Colville”).60 There, the State of Washington sought to collect retail 
sales tax on cigarettes sold on tribal lands to non-tribal members.61 The tobacco sellers were 
 
51 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. 685. 
52 Id. at 685-86.   
53 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686-87. 
54 Id. at 690-91. 
55 Id. at 691. 
56 Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 482-83 (1976).  
57 Id. at 482-83.   
58 Id. at 482-83.   
59 Moe, 425 U.S. at 482-83; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 
(1980).  
60 Colville, 447 U.S. 134. 
61 Id. at 141. 
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federally licensed Indian traders and subject to tribal taxation of their cigarette sales.62 Many of 
the purchasers were “non-Indians – residents of nearby communities who journey to the 
reservation especially to take advantage of the claimed tribal exemption from the state cigarette 
and sales taxes.”63 In other words, “the Indian retailer’s business [was] to a substantial degree 
dependent upon his tax-exempt status,” and the Indian retailer’s sales would fall sharply if the 
retailer lost this tax-exempt status.64 
 As a result, the Court held that “the value marketed by the smokeshops . . . is not generated 
on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest.”65 In Colville, 
federal statutes did not preempt the state tax like in Warren Trading Post. Because Washington’s 
taxation scheme did not interfere with tribal sovereignty and because the tribes were merely 
marketing a tax exemption, the Court upheld the tax.66 In comparing the economic interests of the 
tribes with Washington’s interest in raising revenues through their own taxation, the Court stated: 
 
the [tribal] interest is strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated 
on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the 
recipient of tribal services. The State also has a legitimate governmental interest in 
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax is directed at 
off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state services.67 
 
Almost three weeks after the Court decided Colville, it issued Bracker.  
In Bracker, the White Mountain Apache Tribe and Pinetop Logging Co., a non-Indian 
business, filed for a refund of a motor carrier license tax and use fuel taxes paid for logging 
activities conducted solely on tribal land.68 They argued that the taxes were preempted by federal 
law, or, in the alternative, that the taxes unlawfully infringed on tribal self-governance. After 
creating the Bracker balancing test, the Supreme Court held that these taxes were preempted by 
federal law, and thus, improperly assessed.69 
The Court initially clarified three principles of Indian law jurisprudence. First, the Court 
stated that there are two independent, yet related barriers that will preclude a state’s taxation 
authority: (1) the exercise of taxation authority is preempted by federal law and (2) the exercise of 
taxation authority unlawfully infringes on the rights of tribal members on tribal lands “to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them.”70 Either barrier can independently block a state’s taxation 
authority regarding “activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.”71 Yet, although 
 
62 Id. at 144. The Indian Trader Statutes set for the requirements for a federally licensed Indian trader. 25 U.S.C. §§ 
261-264; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 467-69 (2d Cir. 2013).  
63 Colville, 447 U.S. at 145. 
64 Id. at 145. 
65 Id. at 155. 
66 Id. at 155-57. 
67 Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57. See also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 
(1991). 
68 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1980).  
69 Id. at 152-53. 
70 Id. at 142 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 
71 Id. at 143. 
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principles of tribal self-governance are “deeply engrained in our jurisprudence,” tribal self-
governance remains dependent on, and subject to, Congress.72 
Second, the Court acknowledged that tribal sovereignty is distinct in form and substance 
from state sovereignty, and as such, the typical federal preemption analysis is not relevant.73 Thus, 
“[t]he tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must inform the 
determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal 
law.”74 As a result, courts consider the broad policies underlying tribal sovereignty, construe 
ambiguities in federal law generously, and do not limit federal preemption in this context to 
scenarios where Congress explicitly announced an intent to preempt state activity.75 
Third, the Court limited this new balancing test to state assertions of authority “over the 
conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”76 It emphasized that the on-
reservation conduct of tribe members is generally immune from state taxation because a state’s 
regulatory interest is likely minimal, and the federal interest in fostering tribal self-governance is 
“at its strongest.”77  
In finding federal preemption, the Court employed what is now known as the Bracker 
balancing test. The Court’s formulation of this test stated in full: 
 
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation. In such cases we 
have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of 
both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have 
developed from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not 
dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but 
has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal 
interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, 
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.78 
 
 The Court held that federal regulation of harvesting timber on tribal lands was extensive, 
stating that “the Bureau of Indian Affairs exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting 
and management of tribal timber.”79 Any state taxation interference would obstruct federal 
policies, including the revitalization of tribal self-governance and tribal control of their own 
business and economic affairs.80 “[E]qually important, [Arizona was] unable to identify any 
regulatory function, or service performed . . . that would justify the assessment of taxes for 
activities on Bureau and tribal roads with the reservation.”81 
 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 143-44. 
76 Id. at 144-45. 
77 Id. at 144. 
78 White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144-45. 
79 Id. at 145-47. 
80 Id. at 148-49. 
81 Id.  
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 Although the clear focus in Bracker was on the pervasiveness of federal regulation and 
involvement in the timber operation, the Court, like in Warren Trading Post, emphasized the 
complete lack of involvement of Arizona for the taxed activities, stating that a state’s general desire 
to raise revenue was insufficient to justify the tax.82 
 Lastly, the Court seemed to give weight to undisputed fact that “the economic burden of 
the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe.”83 However, the Court couched this statement 
with a footnote explaining that this fact alone did not result in preemption.84 Rather, Bracker rested 
“on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.”85 Thus, Arizona’s 
motor carrier license tax and use fuel taxes were preempted.86 The dissent argued that Arizona’s 
“relatively trivial taxes” did not impose “an economic burden that would threaten to ‘obstruct 
federal policies.’”87 
 
82 Id. at 150. 
83 Id. at 151. 
84 Id. at 151 n.15. Footnote 15 states in full: 
Of course, the fact that the economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe does not by itself mean that 
the tax is pre-empted, as Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), makes clear. Our 
decision today is based on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, 
which, like that in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), leaves 
no room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 152-53. 
87 Id. at 157-59 (Stevens, J. dissenting). More fully, the dissent stated 
Even assuming, however, that the state courts would uphold the imposition of taxes based 
on the use of BIA roads, despite their similarities to private and tribal roads, I would not find those 
taxes to be pre-empted by federal law. In Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 
685, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165, the Court held that state taxation of a non-Indian doing business 
with a tribe on the reservation was pre-empted because the taxes threatened to “disturb and 
disarrange” a pervasive scheme of federal regulation and because there was no governmental interest 
on the State’s part in imposing such a burden. See Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 168, 100 S.Ct. 2592, 2596, 65 L.Ed.2d 684 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In this 
case we may assume, arguendo, that the second factor relied upon in Warren Trading Post is 
present. As a result, Pinetop may well have a right to be free from taxation as a matter of due process 
or equal protection. But I cannot agree that it has a right to be free from taxation because of its 
business relationship with the petitioner Tribe. . . . 
From a practical standpoint, the Court’s prediction of massive interference with federal 
forest-management programs seems overdrawn, to say the least. The logging operations involved in 
this case produced a profit of $1,508,713 for the Indian tribal enterprise in 1973. As noted above, 
the maximum annual taxes Pinetop would be required to pay would be $5,000–$6,000 or less than 
1% of the total annual profits. Given the State’s concession in this Court that the use of certain roads 
should not have been taxed as a matter of state law, the actual taxes Pinetop would be required to 
pay would probably be considerably less. It is difficult to believe that these relatively trivial taxes 
could impose an economic burden that would threaten to “obstruct federal policies.” 
Under these circumstances I find the Court’s reliance on the indirect financial burden 
imposed on the Indian Tribe by state taxation of its contractors disturbing. As a general rule, a tax 
is not invalid simply because a nonexempt taxpayer may be expected to pass all or part of the cost 
of the tax through to a person who is exempt from tax. See United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 
469, 78 S.Ct. 474, 476, 2 L.Ed.2d 424, cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10. In Warren Trading Post the Court found 




Issued on the same day as Bracker, Justice Marshall also penned Central Machinery Co. 
v. Arizona State Tax Commission.88 Arizona imposed a transaction privilege tax on business 
conducted in the state, which was imposed on the seller.89 Central Machinery sold eleven farm 
tractors to Gila River Farms, an enterprise of the Gila River Indian Tribe.90 Gila River Farms 
operated on tribal and trust land on the Gila River Reservation.91 Central Machinery solicited the 
sale, contracted, received payment, and delivered the tractors on the reservation.92 Further, Central 
Machinery included the anticipated transaction privilege tax amount in its contract price.93  
The Court determined that this case was similar to Warren Trading Post, with two 
immaterial differences: (1) Central Machinery was not a federally-licensed Indian Trader and (2) 
Central Machinery did not have a permanent place of business on the reservation.94 Because the 
transaction occurred on the reservation, it was “plainly subject to federal regulation,” regardless 
of whether Central Machinery was a licensed trader.95 Further, because the transaction fell within 
the Indian Trader Statutes, federal law expressly preempted the state tax.96 Central Machinery’s 
only reference to Bracker related to the relief of state burdens and responsibilities when a tribe is 
left to conduct its affairs without state interference.97  
In his dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the transaction did not fall within the Indian 
Trader Statutes.98 Rather, Central Machinery was like any other corporation doing business in 
Arizona, deriving benefits and services from the state at the taxpayer’s expense.99 As a result, the 
dissent argued that the majority should have considered “the State’s valid governmental 
justification for taxing the transaction.”100 Further, the majority should have inquired into “federal, 
tribal and state interests, without which a rational accommodation of those interest is not 
possible.”101 In other words, the dissent argued that there should have been a Bracker balancing 
analysis, where presumably, the dissent would have upheld Arizona’s taxation authority.102 
 
tribe and a non-Indian trader to such an extent that there was no room for the additional burden of 
state taxation. In this case, since the state tax is unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on the 
tribal business, I would not infer the same congressional intent to confer a tax immunity. Although 
this may be an appropriate way in which to subsidize Indian industry and encourage Indian self-
government, I would require more explicit evidence of congressional intent than that relied on by 
the Court today. 
88 Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
89 Id. at 161-62. 
90 Id. at 161. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Cent. Mach. Co., 448 U.S. at 164. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 165-66. 
97 Id. at 164. 
98 Id. at 168-69 (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
99 Id. at 169. 
100 Id. at 170. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. In a separate dissent, Justice Powell wrote to explain why he joined the majority in Bracker but dissented 
from Central Machinery. Id. at 170 (Powell, J. dissenting). 
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Although Bracker was “in all relevant respects indistinguishable from Warren Trading Post,”103 
Bracker created a new balancing test for implied preemption while leaving intact an avenue for 
more traditional explicit preemption in cases like Warren Trading Post and Central Machinery.104 
Just two years later, in Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court 
employed the Bracker balancing test to strike down New Mexico’s gross receipts tax on a non-
Indian construction company that developed school facilities for the Ramah Navajo School 
Board.105 The school board solicited funds from Congress for new school facilities, contracted 
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for the design and construction of the school, and 
subcontracts were subject to BIA approval.106 Writing for the majority once again, Justice Marshall 
stated, “This case is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from [Bracker.]”107 Federal 
regulation of the construction and financing of tribal educational institutions was both 
comprehensive and pervasive.108 Although the Court recognized that New Mexico had a regulatory 
interest regarding the services it provided to the non-Indian contractor off the reservation, this 
interest was “not a legitimate justification for a tax whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal 
organization.”109 Thus, as recognized by Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, the majority gave 
significance to the economic burden of the tribe in addition to the pervasiveness of federal 
regulation—weight that was not explicitly given in Bracker itself.110 
Neither Bracker nor Ramah provided specifics regarding the required considerations for 
balancing state, federal, and tribal interests. And after the membership of the Supreme Court 
changed during the 1980s, the Court strayed from Justice Marshall’s initial concept of implied 
preemption. 
In 1989, the Court once again considered the contours of the Bracker balancing test in 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico.111 Under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe had the authority to execute mineral leases.112 The Tribe’s mineral leases 
covered a substantial portion of its land and constituted the primary source of the Tribe’s 
revenues.113 Cotton Petroleum was one of the Tribe’s non-Indian lessees, paying the Tribe 
severance and privilege taxes which amounted to about six percent of Cotton Petroleum’s 
revenue.114 Cotton Petroleum also paid five of New Mexico’s taxes, equal to about eight percent 
of its revenue.115 
 
103 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 153 (1980). 
104 Cent. Mach., 448 U.S. at 165-66. 
105 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 834-35 (1982). 
106 Id. at 835. 
107 Id. at 839. 
108 Id.  
109 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844. The Court also rejected the Solicitor General’s invitation to modify this 
preemption analysis to rely on the dormant Indian Commerce Clause.  U.S. Const. Art I, § 8, cl. 3.  Id. at 845-46. 
110 Id. at 853-54 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 n.15 
(1980). 
111 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
112 Id. at 167.   
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
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Cotton Petroleum was the sequel to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.116 In Merrion, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Tribe’s power to impose a severance tax on the production of oil and 
gas by non-Indian lessees operating on the Tribe’s land.117 Cotton Petroleum addressed whether 
New Mexico could also impose severance taxes on that same production of oil and gas.118  
In Cotton Petroleum, the Court held that the New Mexico tax was not preempted.119 The 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 supported the concept of providing tribes with an additional 
revenue source, but Congress had not intended to remove all barriers to maximized profits.120 
Further, the Court discussed the repudiation of intergovernmental tax immunity in the first third 
of the twentieth century, and states’ longstanding ability to tax oil and gas leases on public lands.121 
Thus, the Court found that the Act neither expressly prohibited nor permitted state taxation of these 
mineral leases.122 
Turning to Bracker and Ramah, the Court found distinctions in the pervasiveness of federal 
regulation of mineral leases.123 Here, New Mexico provided services to both the Tribe and Cotton 
Petroleum.124 New Mexico’s services included regulating Cotton Petroleum’s wells located on the 
reservation.125 The federal and tribal regulations were “extensive,” but these regulations were not 
exclusive.126 And although Cotton Petroleum argued that the tax amount paid to New Mexico was 
disproportionate to the services it received, the Court rejected the proportionality argument.127  
The Court held: 
 
We thus conclude that federal law, even when given the most generous 
construction, does not pre-empt New Mexico’s oil and gas severance taxes. This is 
not a case in which the State has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, 
save tax it. Nor is this a case in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a 
substantial burden on the Tribe. It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the New 
Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect on the demand for on-reservation 
leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the Tribe to increase 
its tax rate. Any impairment to the federal policy favoring the exploitation of on-
reservation oil and gas resources by Indian tribes that might be caused by these 
effects, however, is simply too indirect and too insubstantial to support Cotton’s 
claim of pre-emption. To find pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens 
on this broad congressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those 
present in Bracker and Ramah Navajo School Bd., would be to return to the pre-
1937 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. Any adverse effect on the 
 
116 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
117 Id. at 144.  
118 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 166 (1989). 
119 Id. at 177.   
120 Id. at 180. 
121 Id. at 179-80. 
122 Id. at 179-80. 
123 Id. at 186. 
124 Id. at 185. 
125 Id. at 186.   
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
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Tribe’s finances caused by the taxation of a private party contracting with the Tribe 
would be ground to strike the state tax. Absent more explicit guidance from 
Congress, we decline to return to this long-discarded and thoroughly repudiated 
doctrine.128 
 
Additionally, the Court endorsed the multiple taxation of Cotton Petroleum by the Tribe 
and New Mexico.129 Recognizing that three different governments had jurisdiction over Cotton 
Petroleum’s wells that were located (1) on the Tribe’s land, (2) within New Mexico, and (3) within 
the United States, the Court stated, “The federal sovereign has the undoubted power to prohibit 
taxation of the Tribe’s lessees by the Tribe, by the State, or by both, but since it has not exercised 
that power, concurrent taxing jurisdiction over all of Cotton’s on-reservation leases exists.”130 The 
Court acknowledged that this concurrent jurisdiction could be detrimental to the Tribe, but held: 
 
There is simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an adverse effect on 
the Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees. It is, of course, reasonable to infer 
that the existence of the state tax imposes some limit on the profitability of Indian 
oil and gas leases—just as it no doubt imposes a limit on the profitability of off-
reservation leasing arrangements—but that is precisely the same indirect burden 
that we [previously] rejected as a basis for granting non-Indian contractors an 
immunity from state taxation.131 
 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cotton Petroleum pointed out the majority’s alterations of 
the Bracker balancing test. First, the majority’s approach allowed preemption only when a state is 
“entirely excluded from a sphere of activity and provides no services to the Indians or to the lessees 
they seek to tax.”132 This, according to the dissent, was inconsistent with a flexible balancing 
test.133  
Second, the dissent continued, “Under the majority analysis, insignificant state 
expenditures, reflecting minimal state interests, are sufficient to support state interference with 
significant federal and tribal interests.”134 This disregard for the proportionality of interests in a 
balancing inquiry was antithetical to implied preemption.135  
Third, the dissent criticized the approval of multiple taxation by the majority, which 
minimized its adverse effects on the Tribe.136 A market can only bear a certain amount of taxation, 
and inevitably, a state’s taxes will create a ceiling on tribal tax revenues.137 Because tribal taxation 
 
128 Id. at 186-87. 
129 Id. at 188. 
130 Id. at 188-89. 
131 Id. at 191. 
132 Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 208. 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 210. 
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is essential to protecting tribal interests, multiple taxation is a threat to those tribal interests.138 The 
dissent reasoned that the Court should necessarily consider the importance of the taxed activity of 
the tribe, in addition to the size of the tax.139  
 But not all state taxation is subject to Bracker balancing. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Chickasaw Nation, Oklahoma attempted to collect retail sales tax from the Chickasaw-owned gas 
stations.140 The Court held, “The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases, 
therefore, is who bears the legal incidence of a tax.”141 When the legal incidence falls on a tribe or 
its members for sales within Indian country, the tax cannot be imposed absent explicit 
congressional authorization.142 If the legal incidence instead falls on a non-Indian, there is no 
categorical bar to the tax, and the Bracker balancing test determines its validity.143 Thus, a 
threshold question is on whom does the legal incidence of the tax fall. In Oklahoma’s taxation 
scheme, the retailer of the fuel bore the legal incidence of the tax.144 As a result, Oklahoma could 
not enforce the tax on tribal fuel retailers.145  
Similarly, the most recent Supreme Court case related to implied preemption, Wagnon v. 
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, did not apply the Bracker balancing test.146 In Wagnon, Kansas 
imposed a fuel tax on the receipt of fuel by distributors within the state.147 Under this taxation 
scheme, the fuel distributer, who delivered the gasoline to a Tribe-owned gas station, paid the tax 
on its initial receipt of fuel and passed along the cost of the tax to the Tribe.148 The Tribe’s gas 
station was adjacent to the Tribe’s multi-million dollar casino, in an otherwise remote and rural 
area. 
Before Wagnon arrived in the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit conducted a Bracker 
balancing analysis and held that the tax was preempted because the value generated on the Tribe’s 
land by the casino created the fuel market for the Tribe’s gas station.149 Thus, the appellate court 
held that the Tribe’s interest outweighed the state’s general interest to raise revenues.150 But the 
Supreme Court reversed.151 Because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the fuel distributor who 
was operating off-reservation, the Court held that Bracker did not apply to the distributor’s off-
reservation fuel purchases that were then sold at the Tribe’s gas station.152 Accordingly, Wagnon 
clarified a second threshold determination before a court conducts a Bracker balancing analysis. 
In addition to determining whether the legal incidence falls on an Indian or non-Indian as set out 
 
138 Id. at 209. 
139 Id.  
140 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995). 
141 Id. at 458.  
142 Id. at 459.   
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 461-62. 
145 Id.  
146 Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).  
147 Id. at 99. 
148 Id. at 99-100. 
149 Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 987 (10th Cir. 2004). 
150 Id. 
151 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101. 
152 Id. at 101-02. 
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in Chickasaw Nation, a court considers whether the challenged tax is assessed on or off tribal 
land.153  
The Supreme Court has not addressed the Bracker balancing test since 2005 in Wagnon.154 
The intervening fifteen years have seen a variety of state and federal courts wrestling with Bracker 
for a number of different taxes. Although the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to address 
state and federal court applications of the Bracker balancing test in October 2020, the Court denied 
certiorari.155  
 
III. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF BRACKER 
 
This Part examines a collection of lower court decisions citing Bracker that determined 
whether state tax laws were preempted. We present the regression analysis models under which 
we found a relationship between federal preemption and two categories of state taxes. Both models 
demonstrated that courts were more likely to find that a cigarette tax was not preempted and less 
likely to hold that a motor fuel tax was preempted. Our analyses also revealed the absence of any 
significant association between federal preemption and other variables, such as the court system 
in which the case was filed, the presence of a tribe in the litigation, the wealth of the tribe, and the 
tribal law expertise of the attorney challenging the tax.  
When we compiled this set of cases, we first identified all opinions in the Westlaw database 
that cited Bracker during the period June 27, 1980 through June 27, 2020.156 We eliminated 
decisions that did not concern challenges to state taxes. If a case was appealed to a higher court 
and the higher court issued an opinion, we omitted the decision of the subordinate court even if 
the higher court did not cite Bracker.157 When a court issued multiple decisions in the same matter, 
we kept the final opinion and omitted the court’s earlier decisions in the same lawsuit. After 
filtering out over 400 lower court decisions, 59 cases remained.158  
We adjusted the database to account for situations in which one court ruled on challenges 
directed against multiple unrelated taxes. As a result, we created three replica cases in instances in 
 
153 Id. at 102.  
154 However, Chief Justice Roberts recently mentioned the Bracker balancing test in his dissent in McGirt v. 
Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
155 Rogers Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr. v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 24, 24 (2020).  
156 The 40-year period of this study begins on June 27, 1980, the date the Supreme Court decided Bracker. Lower 
courts continue to cite Bracker. For instance, in Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Terwilliger, No. 4:17-CV-04055-
KES, 2020 U.S. Dist. (D.S.D. Oct. 21, 2020), the District Court for South Dakota conducted a full Bracker, and 
determined that an excise tax was preempted.  The decision is currently on appeal in the Eighth Circuit.  Similarly, 
in Pickerel Lake Outlet Ass’n v. Day Cty., 953 N.W.2d 82 (S.D. 2020), the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld ad 
valorum property taxes on non-Indian owners of improvements on Indian trust land.  
157 If on appeal the higher court did not issue an opinion, we did not eliminate the case from the dataset. E.g., Crow 
Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), summarily aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988). 
158 Our data set of 59 cases includes some decisions in which the court did not conduct a complete Bracker 
balancing analysis. Sometimes, a court decides whether a tax is preempted without explicitly weighing federal, 
tribal, and state interests.  We included these cases because the courts cited Bracker in determining the issue of 
preemption, albeit in a cursory fashion.   
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which two taxes were challenged159 and three replica cases when a court ruled on three taxes.160 
After making these adjustments, the final number of cases in the dataset was 64.161 The complete 
list of cases appears in Appendix A. 
We examined each case to identify a variety of characteristics including date of decision, 
level of court, jurisdiction, and types of businesses subject to tax. Table 1 displays a cross-
tabulation of the data on these characteristics in comparison to the court outcomes on the question 
of Bracker preemption. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 1. Cross-tabulation of Findings of No Preemption by Lower Court Case Characteristics 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
     No preemption Total cases % State prevailed 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Decade of decision 
1980-89      8         17   47% 
1990-99    10         15   67% 
 2000-09      8         13   62% 
2010-19    14         18   78% 
2020       1           1   100% 
Level of court 
 U.S. District Court     7         10   70% 
 
159 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (rental and utility taxes); Ute Mountain 
Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011) (five taxes on the extraction of oil and gas); Maryboy v. 
Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) (income tax claims by two different litigants); Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (income and personal property taxes). 
160 Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (retail sales & use; business & 
occupation; and personal property). 
161 Some cases involving multiple taxes were not cloned because the taxes were intertwined. See, e.g., Narragansett 
Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (cigarette sale and excise taxes); Hoopa Valley 
Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989) (timber yield and timber reserve fund taxes); Hoopa Valley Tribe v. 
Nevins, 590 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (timber yield and timber reserve fund  taxes); Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d 895 
(coal severance & gross proceeds from coal sales taxes); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 
1981), amended 665 F.2d 1390 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (coal severance & gross proceeds from 
coal sales taxes).  
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  U.S. Court of Appeals  16         28   57%  
State intermediate court    10         13   77% 
Highest state court      8         13   62% 
Jurisdiction  
Federal (district and appellate)  
 1st Circuit    1             1  100% 
 2nd Circuit    3             3  100% 
 4th Circuit    0             2      0% 
 8th Circuit    2             5    40% 
 9th Circuit    12           20    60% 
10th Circuit    4             5    80% 
11th Circuit    1             2    50% 
 All federal courts  23           38    61% 
State (appellate and supreme) 
 Alaska      2           2   100% 
Arizona     5           6     83% 
California     3           3   100% 
Idaho      0           1       0% 
Kansas      0           1       0% 
Montana     1           1   100% 
New Mexico     3           5     60% 
Oklahoma     0           1       0% 
Utah      1           3          33% 
351 
 
Washington     1           1   100%  
Wisconsin     2           2   100%  
All state courts  18         26     69% 
Type of business 
 Education    0           4       0% 
 Personal residences (non-business) 0           1       0% 
 Timber /logging   1           3     33% 
 Gaming    2           5     40% 
 Hospitality    2           4     50% 
 Personal income taxed  3           6     50% 
 Mining    4           6     67% 
 Manufacturing/distribution  2           3     67%  
Retail/wholesale   15         19     79% 
Construction    5           6     83% 
 Retail/commercial leasing  6           6   100% 
 Legal services    1           1   100% 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Most of the data did not suggest a pattern explaining case outcomes. Even though some 
jurisdictions rendered uniform rulings, there were an insufficient number of cases in those 
jurisdictions from which to draw meaningful conclusions. Likewise, lower courts appeared to be 
consistent in their preemption decisions concerning certain types of businesses. Again, the sample 
size was too small to establish a pattern.  
There did appear, however, that over time lower courts were less likely to find that a state 
tax was preempted. This trend somewhat paralleled the decreasing success rates of advocates for 
Indian interests at the United States Supreme Court. Several scholars have observed that tribal 
interests’ win-loss rate have significantly dropped from the Burger Court years to the first decade 
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of the Roberts Court era. Tribes lost 42% of their cases decided by the Burger Court,162 did not 
prevail in the Rehnquist Court 77% of the time,163 and lost 82% of the time during the first decade 
of the Roberts Court.164  
The pattern seemed to be true for rulings concerning federal preemption of state taxes. As 
presented in Part II above, the Supreme Court’s post-Bracker decisions arguably weakened tribal 
interests’ ability to prevail under the balancing test. Table 2 illustrates how the cases were 
distributed in terms of two benchmarks, the dates on which the Supreme Court released its opinions 
in Cotton Petroleum (04/25/1989) and Wagnon (12/06/2005).165 The table organizes cases into 
three periods separated by these benchmarks.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 2. Findings of No Preemption by Benchmark Periods   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Benchmark period  No preemption Total cases % State prevailed 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-Cotton Petroleum    8   16  50% 
(06/20/1980-4/25/1989) 
Post-Cotton/pre-Wagnon   14   23  61% 
(04/26/1989-12/06/2005) 




162 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and 
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280 (2001). 
163 Id.  
164 Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, 
Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2017). For an interesting perspective on the 
influences behind Indian law in the Supreme Court, see Grant Christensen, Judging Indian Law: What Factors 
Influence Individual Justices’ Votes on Indian Law in the Modern Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 267 (2012).  
165 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 





A. Dependent and Principal Independent Variables 
 
Based on the apparent pattern over time, we designed two models. The first model tested 
the hypothesis that lower courts were more likely to find that a challenged state tax is not 
preempted as the length of time transpiring after the Supreme Court decided Bracker increased. 
The dependent variable for our first models was the case outcome on the issue of federal 
preemption of the challenged tax, i.e., whether the challenged tax was preempted. The principal 
independent variable of days after Bracker represented the number of days the lower court decision 
was entered after June 20, 1980, when the Supreme Court published Bracker. Values range from 
59 to 14,472.  
The second model focused on outcomes entered in the three benchmarked periods 
presented in Table 2. This model tested the hypothesis that lower courts were increasingly likely 
to find that a challenged state tax was preempted after the Supreme Court entered a ruling that 
limited tribal interests in its application of the Bracker balancing test. Using the same dependent 
variable, the second model employed the principal independent variable of benchmark period. 
Cases decided the day Cotton Petroleum was published or before are coded “1.” We labeled a case 
“3” if the court issued the decision later than the day after the Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Wagnon. The cases falling within these periods were coded “2.” 
 
B. Explanatory Variables 
 
We included six additional explanatory factors as control variables in both models to test 
the relationship between the principal independent variable and the dependent variable. Federal 
court was an independent control variable because tribal interests appeared to succeed more before 
federal courts than in state courts (61% v. 69%). One possible explanation was that federal judges 
were not subject to the political pressure that may have influenced their state counterparts.166 Some 
state courts may have been less inclined to enter a ruling striking a source of revenue that indirectly 
funded judicial operations.   
Tribe in case was included because we expected that when a tribe participated in the 
litigation, it was more likely to convince the court of the strength of its interest than if it did not 
have a voice in the proceedings. A recent California appellate court reinforced this assumption. 
The court stated, “Notably, the Tribe is not a party to this case” and found the state’s interest 
outweighed federal and tribal interests.167 This variable denoted the presence of one or more tribes 
in the case as either a party or amicus curiae. 
 
166 We did not investigate whether political pressure was exerted in the cases included in the dataset. We note that 
federal judges, unlike most state judges, are appointed for life and presumably should not be influenced by external 
factors. 
167 Herpel v. County of Riverside, 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444, 447 (App. 2020). 
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 Tribal wealth measured the relative prosperity of the tribe whose interests were at stake in 
the case. We hypothesized that wealthy tribes and their business partners were better equipped to 
present their case than less affluent tribes and their associates.168 For this variable, we used the 
median 1999 household income of the tribe as reported by the United States Census.169 When more 
than one tribe participated in the case, we averaged the median income of each tribe. In the single 
case in which the court did not identify tribes doing business with the non-tribal litigant, we 
averaged the median household incomes for all of tribes in the dataset.170 This variable, admittedly, 
is not an exact measure of affluence. For our analysis, however, it operated as a crude proxy of 
relative wealth among tribes. 
 Attorney tribal law specialty was used to denote whether one of the attorneys, representing 
a tribe or a party advancing tribal interests, possessed an expertise in American Indian law. We 
used this label when attorneys or their firms represented themselves as specialists in this field. 
Likewise, when the attorney represented different tribes in different cases, the attorney was 
deemed a specialist. 
 The final two control variables are related to the type of tax at issue.171 Cigarette tax 
denoted that the case involved a challenge to a state cigarette tax. Seventeen days before Bracker 
was decided, the Supreme Court in Colville held that a state cigarette sales tax levied against on-
reservation purchases made by non-members of the tribe was valid.172 We hypothesized that lower 
courts faced with a challenge to a cigarette tax would have found Colville dispositive and thus 
would not have found that the tax was preempted under the Bracker balancing test.  
 Fuel tax was an explanatory variable denoting that the case concerned a challenge to a state 
motor fuel tax (MFT). Fifteen years after the Court decided Bracker, it ruled in Chickasaw Nation 
that a state could not apply its MFT to fuels sold by a tribe in Indian country.173 We anticipated 
 
168 One scholar speculated that there “would have had a different outcome [in Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d 457] 
if the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was much less financially impressive, or if the property tax had a greater impact 
on the Tribe’s bottom line.” Edward A. Lowe, Comment, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard: The 
Preemption of State Taxes Under Bracker, the Indian Trader Statutes, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 47 
CONN L. REV. 197, 215 (2014). It is also noteworthy that some courts have referenced the wealth of the tribe when 
conducting a Bracker balancing test analysis. E.g., Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 1048-49 
(W.D. Wash. 2018) (“Tulalip is by all accounts in excellent financial health”). 
169 See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKAN NATIVES BY TRIBE AND LANGUAGE: 2000, 715-729. 
(December 2003). The list of tribes along with their respective 1999 median household incomes is presented in 
Appendix B.  
170 See Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev., 432 P.3d 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
171 We chose cigarette and fuel taxes as control variables because the Supreme Court reviewed preemption 
challenges to these taxes near the time that Bracker was decided but did not rely on the Bracker balancing test in its 
analysis. 
172 447 U.S. 134 (1980). Colville is one of three tribal tobacco case decided by the Court during the past fifty years 
that upheld the challenged taxes. E.g., Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. v. Milheim Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61 
(1994) (upholding New York statute imposing recordkeeping requirements and quantity limitations on cigarette 
wholesalers who sell untaxed cigarettes to reservation Indians); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of 
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (upholding Montana law requiring Indian retailers on tribal land to 
collect a state cigarette tax imposed on sales to non-Indian customers). 
173 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
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that lower court rulings on challenges to motor fuel taxes would follow Chickasaw Nation 
concluding that the state was barred from applying its tax to tribes.  
 Tribal wealth was a continuous variable. The five other explanatory variables were binary, 




There was no relationship between federal preemption and the primary independent 
variables or for three of the five explanatory variables. Table 3 presents the analysis for both 
models. Surprisingly, neither primary independent variable was significantly related to the case 
outcome on the issue of federal preemption. Two control variables were associated with case 
outcomes at statistically significant levels. For cigarette tax, the association was positive, and fuel 
tax was negatively related to the finding of no preemption. There was no relationship between 
preemption and the other control variables. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 3. Predictions of No Preemption Outcomes (N=64) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
      Model 1   Model 2  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Days after Bracker decided    0.000  
      (0.000) 
 
Three benchmark periods        0.064 
          (0.083) 
 
Federal court     -0.017    -0.007 
      (0.128)   (0.129) 
 
Tribe in case (party or amicus)  -0.069     -0.079  
      (0.166)   (0.168) 
 
Tribal wealth      6.730    0.000 
      (9.257)   (9.83) 
 
Attorney tribal law specialty   -0.023    -0.027 
      (0.210)   (0.216) 
 
Cigarette tax     0.327*    0.341* 




Fuel tax     -0.484**   -0.479* 
      (0.191)   (0.193) 
 
Constant     0.142    0.416 
      (0.303)   (0.307) 
 
R2       0.257    0.249 
 
Adjusted R2     0.164    0.155 
 
Note: The top line of each entry indicates the coefficient from a linear regression predicting a 
ruling of no preemption of tax. The parentheses in the second line of each entry contain the 
corresponding standard errors. Asterisks: * p≤0.05 and ** p≤0.01. 
 
D. Discussion of Results 
 
There are several noteworthy findings of these analyses. Both models revealed that lower 
courts adhere to the key Supreme Court decisions when the type of tax being challenged is the 
same as the tax ruled upon by the Supreme Court. As we expected, lower courts were more likely 
to find no preemption in cigarette cases, in harmony with Colville. Likewise, lower courts were 
apt to find that fuel taxes were preempted, consistent with the holding of Chickasaw Nation. 
 Contrary to expectations, there was no significant relationship between the passage of time 
or benchmark period and preemption case outcomes. To ferret out possible explanations, we took 
a closer look at the decisions rendered in the cases. We discovered discrepancies in the manner in 
which lower courts approached the Bracker balancing test. Some took state interests into account 
but did not consider tribal interests in reaching their decisions.174 Others cited Bracker but did not 
balance federal, tribal, and state interests.175  
We also discovered inconsistent rulings on a number of issues. For instance, courts differed 
as to whether a non-tribal party had standing to assert a tribe’s sovereign right to self-
government.176 Others disagreed regarding a tax’s economic effect on tribes and whether such 
 
174 To determine whether this phenomenon affected our results, we substituted tribal interest for preemption 
outcome as the dependent variable in both models and ran the tests. Again, there was no relationship between the 
key independent variables with the dependent variable in either model. 
175 E.g., Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (state taxing tribe for activities 
occurring on reservation); Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v. Rev. Div. of Dep’t of Taxation and Rev., 
759 P.2d 186 (N.M. 1988) (tribal activity was beyond reservation boundaries thereby susceptible to state taxation); 
Fatt v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 884 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1994) (individual Indian claimed exemption from income 
tax); Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) (individual Indians claimed exemption from 
income tax); Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (property taxes on permanent improvements on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held 
in trust for Indians). 
176 Compare Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that non-Indian coal 




effect should have been taken into account in balancing interests.177 Decisions varied as to whether 
federal leasing regulations or the Indian Trader Statutes and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) created a strong interest in promoting tribal self-government and tribal self-sufficiency.178 
The next Part examines these inconsistencies.  
 
IV. LOWER COURT INCONSISTENCIES 
 
 In this Part, we consider divergent sets of decisions in the lower courts. As set forth in Part 
III, aside from cigarette and retail fuel taxes, the application of the Bracker balancing test is 
unpredictable. Justice Rehnquist in his Ramah dissent anticipated such variant outcomes.179 He 
pointed to the contrasting levels of significance the Bracker and Ramah majorities gave to the 
economic burden a challenged tax imposes on a tribe. The Bracker Court afforded minimal 
weight,180 whereas the Ramah majority gave “paramount consideration” to the economic burden 
on the tribe.181 Justice Rehnquist stated, “The general question presented by this case has occupied 
the Court many times in the recent past, and seems destined to demand its attention over and over 
again until the Court sees fit to articulate, and follow, a consistent and predictable rule of law.”182 
The Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of the Bracker balancing test within the early years 
of its formulation foretold of its discrepant treatment by the lower courts for the decades that 
followed.  
Ten years after Ramah, Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court echoed 
Justice Rehnquist’s criticism, describing the Bracker balancing test as “uncertain guidance to state 
and federal courts.”183 Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts described it as “a nebulous balancing 
test,” which lacks rigidity and “mires state efforts to regulate on reservation lands in significant 
uncertainty, guaranteeing that many efforts will be deemed permissible only after extensive 
 
P.2d 829 (Mont. 1989) (finding that non-tribal pipeline company does not have standing to assert the tribes' 
sovereign right of self-government). 
177 Compare Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 986 n.9 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(“preemption analysis cannot turn on the severity of a direct economic burden on tribal revenues caused by the state 
tax”) with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) (minimal economic effect 
of tax on tribe is considered in balancing interests). 
178 Compare Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1341 (11th Cir. 2015) (federal regulations 
governing the leasing of Indian land sufficiently bring the federal interests within the scope of Bracker) with Herpel 
v. County of Riverside, 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444 (App. 2020) (federal leasing regulations concerning Indian country 
insufficient to outweigh state interests).  
179 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 847-48 (1982) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
180 Id. at 853. 
181 Id. at 848. 
182 Id. at 847.  
183 Anderson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Rev., 484 N.W.2d 914, 923 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting). See also 
Judge Rosenbaum’s introduction in Seminole Tribe v. Stranburg, “Benjamin Franklin said, ‘[I]n this world nothing 
can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.’ He was almost right. As this case illustrates, even taxes are not 
certain when it comes to matters affecting Indian tribes.” 799 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Letter from 
Benjamin Franklin to Jean–Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 12 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 160, 161 
(John Bigelow, ed., Federal ed.1904) (1888)). 
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litigation, if at all.”184 Nearly forty years after Ramah, Justice Rehnquist’s prophecy rings true—
the Bracker analysis continues to spawn inconsistent outcomes. This Part examines three sets of 
contradictory results in the lower courts: a non-Indian’s standing to assert tribal interests, the 
weight afforded economic effect on tribes, and the preemptive force of specific federal 
regulations.185  
 
A. Non-Indian Standing to Assert Tribal Interest 
 
 The first set of divergent decisions involves the right of a non-Indian litigant to present 
tribal interests in support of Bracker preemption. When setting forth the initial test in Bracker, the 
Court held that there should be “a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake.”186 Perhaps because a tribe was a named party in the case, the Bracker 
court did not address whether a non-Indian could assert tribal interests for this balancing test. But 
tribes are not always parties in Bracker balancing cases. As a result, lower courts in different states 
soon came to opposite conclusions on the issue of non-Indian party standing after the Court 
decided Bracker.   
In Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, the State of Arizona attempted to assess a number of taxes 
on Peabody Coal Company, a non-Indian corporation, that mined coal on tribal lands.187 Peabody 
challenged the taxes, arguing in part that the taxes were preempted under Bracker because the 
taxes imposed burdens on the tribes and infringed on tribal sovereignty.188 
 The State of Arizona argued that Peabody lacked standing to claim interference with tribal 
sovereignty.189 The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument and determined that Peabody 
had standing to assert tribal interests.190 It held, “Because the preemption issue cannot be 
considered without also considering the tribal sovereignty issue Peabody, of necessity, must have 
standing to raise the issue of interference of tribal sovereignty.”191 Washington and New Mexico 
appellate courts have similarly rejected this type of standing challenge.192 
 The Montana Supreme Court took the opposite position in Northern Border Pipeline Co. 
v. Montana.193 Northern Border, the non-Indian owner of a natural gas pipeline, contested property 
 
184 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Roberts served as one of 
Justice Rehnquist’s law clerks from 1980 until 1981. Bracker was handed down at the end of the prior term of the 
Court, and Ramah was decided during the subsequent term. 
185 We do not intend for this Part to contain comprehensive list of all the lower court contradictions and variable 
analyses in Bracker balancing cases. However, we address these three issues because they are directly conflicting 
outcomes in the lower courts.  
186 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980). 
187 Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). 
188 Id. at 1096. 
189 Id. at 1098. 
190 Id. at 1099. 
191 Id. at 1099. 
192 Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev., 432 P.3d 411, 423 n.12 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).; see Cotton 
Petroleum v. New Mexico, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 n.2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). 
193 772 P.2d 829. 
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taxes assessed by the State of Montana on portions of the pipeline located on tribal lands.194 Like 
Peabody, Northern Border argued that the property tax was preempted under Bracker, in part 
because the tax interfered with tribal self-governance.195 Montana argued that Norther Border 
lacked standing to assert interference with tribal self-governance, and the Supreme Court of 
Montana agreed.196 The court held that Northern Border, as a non-Indian corporation, could not 
assert the interests of a tribe when the tribe is not a party to the suit.197 Subsequent Montana and 
North Dakota supreme court decisions adopted the Northern Border Pipeline standing rationale 
and denied non-Indian litigants the opportunity to present tribal interests.198 
 
B. The Weight Afforded to Economic Effect on Tribes 
 
 Second, there is significant inconsistency among the courts as to the weight to be given to 
the economic effect on tribes. This incongruence began at the Supreme Court level before it 
emerged in lower court applications of the Bracker balancing test. Indeed, a close examination of 
Bracker, Ramah, and Cotton Petroleum reveals the disparate positions the Supreme Court took as 
to the importance of and emphasis on tribal economic burdens.199 In Bracker, the Court recognized 
the economic burden but dismissed its relevance to a footnote.200 In contrast, the Ramah Court 
relied on the economic burden as a preeminent part of its preemption analysis.201 But in Cotton 
Petroleum, the Court dismissed the adverse economic effect of dual taxation and diminished value 
of tribal leases as “too indirect and too insubstantial” to warrant preemption.202 With the Supreme 
Court’s various approaches to the weight afforded the tribal economic burden, it is no surprise that 
lower courts have charted different courses in the wake of uncertainty. Lower courts’ analyses of 
the economic effect on tribes tend to be rather nuanced and typically manifest as varying degrees 
of consideration. Lower courts choose from the variable Supreme Court precedent to best fit the 
desired outcome while still adhering to the Bracker balancing test. Courts giving great weight to 
tribal interests typically refer to Ramah, whereas courts generally rely on Cotton Petroleum when 
 
194 Id. at 831. 
195 Id. at 835. 
196 Id. at 836. 
197 Id. at 835-36. One could argue that the Montana Supreme Court gave at least some minimal consideration to 
tribal interests in its Bracker balancing analysis and held only that Norther Border Pipeline could not assert tribal 
sovereignty as an independent basis for preemption. However, that court four years later removed any doubt 
regarding the lack of standing for non-Indians in a Bracker analysis in State ex rel. Poll v. Mont. 9th Jud. Dist., 851 
P.2d 405, 410 (Mont. 1993) (“Based upon White Mountain Apache [v. Bracker] and Northern Border, we conclude 
that the defendants do not have standing to raise the argument that the action of the State interferes with the self-
government of the Blackfeet Reservation.”). 
198 State ex rel. Poll, 851 P.2d at 409-10; Baker Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 451 N.W.2d 95, 98 (N.D. 
1990). 
199 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 n.15 (1980); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 844 (1982); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989). 
200 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151 n.15. 
201 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844. 
202 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186-87.   
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dismissing a tribe’s financial interests. A brief examination of five decisions illustrates the variable 
approaches taken in the lower courts. 
In Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, the State of Oklahoma 
attempted to impose a sales tax on non-Indian consumers of the Creek Nation’s bingo enterprise.203 
In balancing interests, the Tenth Circuit held that the tax was preempted, stating:  
 
The imposition of a sales tax would burden the tribal enterprise by increasing the 
total cost of playing bingo and by imposing collection, remittance, and record 
keeping requirements. Although these burdens alone might not serve to displace 
the tax, we believe they are relevant, when, as here, the state’s own interest in taxing 
the on-reservation transaction is minimal.204 
 
But at the same time, the Tenth Circuit, referencing Bracker and Ramah, noted that it did not read 
Colville as creating a per se rule permitting taxation of Indian retailers and nonmember consumers; 
it concluded that the “preemption analysis cannot turn on the severity of a direct economic burden 
on tribal revenues caused by the state tax.”205 Thus, while rejecting the idea that tribal economic 
burden alone could not tip the Bracker balancing test, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless concluded that 
the tribal economic burden was “relevant.”206 
In Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, the Second Circuit upheld a 
municipality’s imposition of a personal property tax on the non-Indian lessors of slot machines 
used at tribal casinos.207 Conducting a Bracker balancing test, the Second Circuit fully considered 
the economic effect on the tribe.208 The Court compared the amount of the tax to amount of 
revenues and contextualized the tax amount within the Tribe’s profitability of its slot machine 
leases.209 Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that the tax was a “substantial sum,”210 it 
found that the tribal economic burden was minimal.211 In doing so, the Court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Cotton Petroleum.212 It distinguished Indian Country U.S.A. as within the 
comprehensive regulation of gaming of IGRA, while the property tax that was at issue was not 
within “IGRA’s pervasive reach.”213  
In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, the State of Montana imposed severance and gross 
proceeds taxes on coal mined from tribal lands by a non-Indian.214 The Ninth Circuit found that 
the taxes were preempted.215 In balancing federal and tribal interests against state interests, the 
 
203 829 F.2d 967, 983-84 (10th Cir. 1987). 
204 Id. at 986-87 (footnote omitted). 
205 Id. at 986 n.9. 
206 Id. at 986-87. 
207 722 F.3d 457, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2013). 
208 Id. at 473-74.   
209 Id.   
210 Id. at 474.   
211 Id. at 473.  
212 Id. at 476. 
213 Id. at 473 n.16.   
214 819 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1987). 
215 Id. at 902.   
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Ninth Circuit afforded great weight to an economic study finding that Montana’s taxes decreased 
tribal coal production and prevented the tribe’s coal from competing with other coal producers.216 
It also stated, “Coal production is vital to the economic development of the Crow Tribe.”217 Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the state was unable to overcome the heavy burden of showing that its 
interests outweighed the Tribe’s economic interests and as a result, found the taxes were 
preempted.218 
Factually similar to Crow Tribe is Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez. 219 The State of 
New Mexico assessed several severance taxes on oil and gas extracted from the Ute Tribe’s land 
by non-Indian lessees.220 The District Court found that, although the legal incidence of the taxes 
was on the non-Indian lessees, the economic burden of the taxes rested with the Tribe.221 The Tenth 
Circuit dismissed this economic consideration.222 Closely adhering to Cotton Petroleum, it stated 
that “indirect economic burdens on the Tribe’s ability to increase its own taxes and attract new 
leases” were not relevant to the Bracker balancing test.223 Thus, these economic burdens were not 
proper justifications for preemption.224 
In Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, the Tulalip Tribes developed a commercial retail center 
which, along with the Tulalip Casino and Tulalip Resort, hosts retailers, restaurants, and an outlet 
mall.225 This commercial center, bordering a major interstate highway, attracts thousands of non-
Indian visitors and customers per day from outside the Tribe’s reservation.226 The State of 
Washington and Snohomish County collected tens of millions of tax dollars from the non-Indian 
retailers through an 8.9% sales tax.227 The Tribe challenged these taxes as impliedly preempted 
and an infringement on its tribal sovereignty. Following the Cotton Petroleum line of cases, the 
District Court disagreed and allowed the general state taxes of the non-Indian retailers within 
Tulalip’s commercial center.228 In the District Court’s balancing, it considered the Tribe’s interests 
in economic development, relied on a report from an expert, and stated that “Tulalip is by all 
accounts in excellent financial health.”229  
These decisions illustrate the varying degrees of consideration given to the tribal economic 
burdens. From outright rejecting any tribal economic burden to carefully weighing and considering 
economic evidence from experts, courts do not adhere to uniform standards. Even in factually 
 
216 Id. at 899-900.   
217 Id. at 901 
218 Id. at 901-02. 
219 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011).  
220 Id. at 1183. 
221 Id. at 1198. 
222 Id. at 1198. 
223 Id. at 1198. 
224 Id. at 1198. 
225 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 1048-49 (W.D. Wash. 2018). 
226 Id. at 1049. 
227 Id. at 1049. 
228 Id. at 1059-62. 
229 Id. at 1057. For a more detailed examination of this taxation conflict between the Tulalip Tribes and the State of 
Washington see Adam Crepelle, Taxes, Theft, and Indian Tribes: Seeking an Equitable Solution to the State 
Taxation of Indian Country Commerce, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 999, 1009-14 (2020).  
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similar cases, courts give different emphasis to the tribal economic burden. Because of the 
inconsistent Supreme Court precedent, most lower courts have great discretion to decide the 
appropriate weight to be afforded the financial burden imposed on tribes. Thus, tribes, tribal 
business partners, and taxing bodies are faced with an unpredictable commercial environment. 
Unfortunately, the divergence in cases involving factually similar scenarios is not confined merely 
to the tribal economic burden.  
 
C. The Preemptive Force of Specific Federal Regulations  
 
 Third, courts render inconsistent decisions concerning taxes on gaming and real estate 
leasing. This is in contrast to cases involving challenges to taxes levied on tobacco sales or retail 
fuel taxes. Lower courts consistently upheld cigarette taxes and held that retail fuel taxes are 
preempted. These two patterns likely stem from Supreme Court precedent focused on both of these 
categories of taxes.230 Unlike these areas of taxation, the Supreme Court has not considered 
preemption challenges to taxes imposed on gaming or real estate leasing. Thus, the preemptive 




Frequently, lower courts address Indian gaming and IGRA. Congressional policies 
underlying IGRA include promotion of tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal governments.232 IGRA expressly preempts the governance of gaming on tribal lands.233 At 
the same time, IGRA grants states some role in the regulation of certain Indian gaming, requiring 
Tribal-State compacts that regulate a tribe’s gaming activities.234 These compacts may include 
 
230 Indeed, Colville, Milheim Attea, and Moe upheld state cigarette taxes on tribal land. Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (upholding Washington cigarette sales tax levied on on-
reservation purchases made by non-members of the tribe); Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. v. Milheim Attea & Bros., 
Inc., 512 U.S.61 (1994) (upholding New York statute imposing recordkeeping requirements and quantity limitations 
on cigarette wholesalers who sell untaxed cigarettes to reservation Indians); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (upholding Montana law requiring Indian retailers on tribal 
land to collect a state cigarette tax imposed on sales to non-Indian customers). Likewise, Chickasaw Nation held that 
a state could not apply its motor fuel tax to fuels sold by a tribe in Indian country. 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
231 In addition, there may be variability with the taxation of mineral and gas leases. Two decisions have found 
preemption, and two have not. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 902 (preempted); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 
F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (preempted); Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1170 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (not 
preempted); Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 660 F.3d at 1198. However, all these decisions were resolved before Cotton 
Petroleum. There are no decisions in our data set regarding mineral or gas leases after Cotton Petroleum. See 
Appendix A. 
232 25 U.S.C. § 2702.  
233 Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). 
234 25 U.S.C. § 2710. For an in-depth examination of IGRA’s implementation and administration, see Kevin K. 
Washburn, Agency Conflict and Culture: Federal Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by the 
National Indian Gaming Commission, The Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Justice, 42 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 303 (2010) and Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 427 (2001).  
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provisions regulating “subjects that directly related to the operation of gaming activities.”235 
However, courts employ the Bracker balancing test when certain taxed activities are associated 
with Indian gaming, but do not fall directly within IGRA and the resulting compacts.236 
 Mentioned above, the Second Circuit in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard 
upheld the imposition of a personal property tax on the non-Indian lessors of slot machines used 
at tribal casinos.237 The taxed activity fell outside of the activities regulated by IGRA.238 After 
balancing interests, the Second Circuit determined that the tax was not preempted.239 The 
Washington Court of Appeals came to a similar result with a business and occupational tax on 
cash-access machine transactions executed on the floor of tribal casinos.240 Likewise, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that a tax on a non-Indian construction contractor’s materials for a tribal casino 
were outside IGRA and not preempted under Bracker.241 
 However, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently diverged from this line of cases. In 
Video Gaming Technologies, Inc. v. Rogers County Board of Tax Roll Corrections, a non-Indian 
corporation, Video Gaming Technologies (VGT), leased its electronic gaming equipment to a 
Cherokee Nation business. 242 The Nation’s business owned and operated ten gaming facilities and 
rented VGT’s gaming equipment and software at these facilities.243 Rogers County assessed ad 
valorem taxes on business personal property within its borders, including the VGT gaming 
equipment located at the Nation’s facilities.244 The Court acknowledged the similarity of these 
facts to Mashantucket Pequot, but found unpersuasive its focus on ownership rather than the role 
the equipment plays in gaming which is the activity comprehensively regulated under IGRA. The 
Court held that the Bracker balancing test required preemption because of the threat posed to 
federal policies underlying IGRA, the economic burden imposed on the Cherokee Nation, and the 
County’s failure to justify the tax other than as a generalized interest in raising revenue.245  
 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Noem, held that Bracker 
preempted South Dakota’s taxes on casino amenities.246 The State of South Dakota imposed a use 
tax on goods and services purchased by non-tribe members at the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe’s 
casino.247 The Eighth Circuit did not find that IGRA expressly preempted the taxation of non-
gaming purchases. Nonetheless, it held that the amenities significantly impacted the success of the 
Tribe’s gaming operations.248 South Dakota’s taxation of these amenities would potentially reduce 
 
235 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii). 
236 722 F.3d 457, 471-72 (2d Cir. 2013) 
237 Id. at 459-60. 
238 Id. at 473-74. 
239 Id. at 469, 473-74. 
240 Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev., 432 P.3d 411, 419, 424 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
241 Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Flandreau Santee 
Sioux Tribe v. Haeder, 938 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2019). 
242 Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Rogers Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr., 475 P.3d 824, 827 (Okla. 2019). 
243 Id. at 826-27. 
244 Id. at 827. 
245 Id. at 832-34. 
246 938 F.3d 928, 937 (8th Cir. 2019).   
247 Id. at 931.  
248 Id. at 936.  
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the Tribe’s revenues and go against IGRA’s policies.249 As a result, the Eighth Circuit held the 
taxes to be preempted under the Bracker balancing test.250 
 
2. Real Estate Leasing  
 
Less often than gaming, lower courts resolve issues regarding state taxation of real estate 
leasing. Section 5108 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 authorizes the Secretary of Interior 
to acquire interests within and outside of existing reservations “for the purpose of providing land 
for Indians” and exempts this realty from state and local taxation.251 The Long-Term Leasing Act 
grants Indian owners the right to lease any restricted Indian lands for business, residential, and 
other delineated purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the Department of Interior.252 
Neither act exhibits an express intent to exclude state taxation. In accordance with the Long-Term 
Leasing Act, the Department promulgated extensive regulations entailing all facets of leasing, 
although they do not govern mineral leases (“the Leasing Regulations”).253 
The courts in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg and Herpel v. County of Riverside 
considered these federal enactments and regulations in their application of the Bracker balancing 
test to determine whether state or local taxes on rental agreements were preempted.254 In Seminole 
Tribe, the Tribe entered into long-term leases with non-Indian corporations to provide food 
operations at its casinos.255 The State of Florida imposed a commercial rent tax on rents paid to 
the Tribe by these non-Indian lessees. The tax was described as a tax on the privilege of engaging 
in the business of renting real property in the state.256 The Eleventh Circuit found that federal 
regulation of Indian land and leasing of Indian land was “extensive, exclusive, comprehensive, 
and pervasive.”257 Even though the Tribe presented no economic impact evidence, the court found 
that the regulatory scheme itself was a sufficient federal interest to outweigh the state’s generalized 
interest in raising revenue that was not specifically linked to governmental services benefiting the 
Tribe. Thus, the rental tax was preempted under the Bracker balancing test.258  
Conversely in Herpel, the California Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion as to 
a local possessory interest tax imposed on non-Indians who leased Indian Land within Riverside 
County.259 Relying extensively on Cotton Petroleum, the Court of Appeals held that the nature of 
 
249 Id. at 936-37.  
250 Id. at 937. 
251 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2016). 
252 25 U.S.C. §§ 415-416j (2012). Although Congress has adopted a number of amendments, the Act maintains 
Department of Interior control over Indian leasing. 
253 See 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.001-703. 
254 Herpel v. County of Riverside, 258 Cal. Rptr.3d 444, 460-61 (App. 2020); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1341 (11th Cir. 2015). 
255 Seminole Tribe, 799 F.3d at 1326.  
256 Id. at 1326. 
257 Id. at 1341. 
258 Id. at 1342-43. 
259 Herpel, 258 Cal. Rptr.3d at 460-61.   
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federal regulations was not strong enough to support preemption.260 In so holding, the California 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that it strayed from Seminole Tribe and other decisions that 
afforded great weight to the federal interest embodied in the scheme set up by the Leasing 
Regulations.261 As in Seminole Tribe, there was no proof of the economic impact the tax had on 
the Tribe. Thus, the tax was not preempted under the Bracker balancing test.  
 These decisions illustrate the disparity of lower court outcomes. In Montana and North 
Dakota, non-Indians do not have standing to present one of the three components of the Bracker 
balancing test.262 Whereas in Arizona and Washington, there is no question that a non-Indian 
litigant may assert the tribal interest for Bracker balancing purposes.263 In the Ninth Circuit, courts 
consider the tribal economic burden regarding non-Indian mineral and gas lessees.264 But the Tenth 
Circuit does not extend the benefit of that same consideration to mineral and gas litigants.265 Taxes 
on leased gaming equipment are preempted in Oklahoma, but upheld in the Second Circuit.266 
From non-Indian standing to assert the tribal interest, to the depth of consideration of the tribal 
economic burden, to conflicting decisions analyzing the same federal regulations, lower court 
decisions present a labyrinth of inconsistency and unpredictability. In Part V, we propose how to 
improve the Bracker balancing test to remedy the currently unworkable standard.   
 
PART V: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
 In this Part, we recommend adjustments to the Bracker balancing test to resolve the lower 
court discrepancies described in Part IV. Initially though, we acknowledge several extrajudicial 
efforts and proposed solutions to lessen the unpredictability surrounding Bracker. Although some 
suggested solutions simplify implied preemption or even act as a death knell to the Bracker 
balancing test, we choose to work within the existing Bracker precedent to resolve the disparate 
outcomes in the lower courts as we explain below. We suggest that courts should grant non-Indians 
standing to assert tribal interests, consider the economic burden on tribes as a key component of 





260 Id. at 456.   
261 Id. at 456 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1341 (11th Cir. 2015); Segundo v. City 
of Rancho Mirage 813 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. 
Thurston Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2013) (preempting a property tax based on the same 
federal regulation of Indian land).  
262 Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. Montana, 772 P.2d 829, 835-36 (Mont. 1989). 
263 Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State 
Dep’t of Rev., 432 P.3d 411, 423 n.12 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
264 Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 
265 Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 1198 (10th Cir. 2011). 
266 Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Rogers Cty Bd. of Tax Roll Corr., 475 P.3d 824, 834 (Okla. 2019); Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 473-74 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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A. Potential Solutions Outside of Bracker 
 
Forty years of lower courts’ application of the Bracker balancing test has produced some 
unfavorable consequences for tribes. The negative impact of state taxation within tribal territory is 
well-documented.267 Aside from the judicial unpredictability issue, the Supreme Court in Cotton 
Petroleum acknowledged and endorsed dual taxation.268 The detrimental effect of dual taxation on 
tribal economic development is well-established.269 Unsurprisingly, some tribes and states have 
entered into taxation compacts to avoid litigating the Bracker balancing test. In addition to 
compacts, scholars have proposed congressional fixes or abandoning Bracker altogether. Further, 
the executive branch through the adoption of administrative regulations has attempted to put a 
thumb on the scales of the Bracker balancing test without success. We briefly summarize each of 
these concepts.270  
 
1. Tribal-State Tax Compacts 
 
 The most successful alternative to litigating an implied preemption issue is the tribal-state 
tax compact. Through this form of revenue-sharing agreement, the tribe and the governmental unit 
voluntarily assign rights, delegate duties, and delineate authority to each party.271 The scope, detail, 
and revenue proportions vary widely among compacts.272 Revenue-sharing agreements limit costly 
 
267 Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Values of Taxation Within the Tribalist Economic Theory, 18 KAN. J.L & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 13-15, 22-23 (2008) (calling for exclusive tribal taxing authority in tribal territory); David Y. Kwok, 
Taxation without Compensation as a Challenge for Tribal Sovereignty, 84 MISS. L.J. 92, 97 (2014); Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development As A Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
759 (2004); Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Justice for Native Nations: Insights from Legal Pluralism, 60 
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 100-03 (2018). 
268 490 U.S. 163, 188-90 (1989).  
269 F. Michael Willis, The Power to Tax Economic Activity in Indian Country, 28 ABA NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 1, 
2-3 (2014); Erin Marie Erhardt, States Versus Tribes: The Problem of Multiple Taxation of Non-Indian Oil and Gas 
Leases on Indian Reservations, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 533, 550-54 (2014); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of 
Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1172 (2004); 
Carpenter, supra note 21, at 371; Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and 
Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93, 
118-23 (2005); Daniel Gick, Fracking in the Badlands: Can Levying a Carbon Tax Against Oil and Gas Companies 
Help Native American Tribes Raise Revenue While Preserving Cherished Tribal Lands?, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 
397, 411-14 (2017). We assume that tribal economic development is a positive goal. For an analysis of this point see 
Jensen supra note 21, at 94-95.  
270 For an examination of what actions tribes could take with their own laws regarding preemption, see Lance 
Morgan, The Rise of Tribes and the Fall of Federal Indian Law, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115 (2017).   
271 Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-to-Government Relations to 
Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295, 1309 (1993); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher et 
al., Indian Country Law Enforcement and Cooperative Public Safety Agreements, 89 MICH. B.J. 42 (2010). These 
compacts have been encouraged by the Supreme Court. Jennifer H. Weddle, Suffer No Tyranny: How State-Tribal 
Relations Might Evolve in Light of the Supreme Court’s Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community Reluctance to 
Referee Intergovernmental Disputes, 62-Apr FED. LAW. 64, 65 (2015). 
272 Cowan, supra note 269 at 133-34; Richard J. Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business with 
Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize the Need for Indian Tribes to Enter Into 
Taxation Compacts with Their Respective State, 78 OR. L. REV. 501, 545-49 (1999). 
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litigation, avoid dual taxation, and provide certainty.273 For example, the State of Montana has 
entered into these agreements with seven reservation governments regarding the taxation of 
alcohol, tobacco, fuel, and in one agreement, oil and natural gas production.274  
However, tribal-state compacts are not without problems. Compacts may create 
enforcement issues, be overly broad, lack necessary enabling authorities, or improperly conflict 
with federal law.275 One party to the agreement often has unequal bargaining power.276 As a result, 
tribes sometimes make major concessions to support negotiations, such as agreeing to an indefinite 
waiver of sovereign immunity.277 Further, because courts are likely to uphold state taxation, states 
may not be motivated to enter into a tax compact. Thus, a state may risk potential litigation because 
of the likelihood of success in court. In contrast however, states have less bargaining power with 
environmental regulation because state environmental laws are more likely to be preempted due 
to the pervasiveness of federal regulation of tribal environmental issues.278 Thus, states have a 
stronger incentive to enter a compact for environmental regulation than a revenue-sharing 
agreement. Although tribal-state compacts vastly improve the prospects of predictable outcomes 
and are frequently employed, litigation requiring a Bracker balancing analysis remains a prevalent 
issue in state and federal courts. As a result, clarity regarding the Bracker balancing test is still 
necessary.  
 
2. Congressional Fix 
 
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes as well as over the states regarding Indian 
affairs.279 The Supreme Court in Cotton Petroleum reiterated that the federal government wields 
the “undoubted power to prohibit taxation” on tribal lands.280 As a result, an act of Congress could 
prohibit states from exercising their taxing authority on Indian land. One solution is federal 
legislation to explicitly restrict states’ powers to tax certain activities within tribal lands.281 
Professor Erik Jensen suggests:  
 
 
273 Krakoff, supra note 269, at 1174; Mack & Timms, supra note 271, at 1305-06.  
274 Policy Basics: Taxes in Indian Country, MONT. BUDGET & POLICY CENTER 13-14 (2017) 
https://mbadmin.jaunt.cloud/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Taxes-in-Indian-Country-Tribal-Governments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V2HA-HKL8]; See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the 
Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 27, 33 (2004) (detailing Michigan’s compacts 
with various tribes located within its borders regarding sales and use, tobacco, and motor fuel taxes); Larry 
Echohawk, Balancing State and Tribal Power to Tax in Indian Country, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 623 (2004) (examining 
Idaho’s state taxation uncertainty and proposing tribal-state compacts).  
275 Mack & Timms, supra note 271, at 1313, 1320. 
276 Cowan, supra note 269, at 134-35. 
277 Fletcher, supra note 274, at 44. 
278 Mack & Timms, supra note 271, at 1309. 
279 Jensen, supra note 21, at 17. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 
(1832). 
280 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189 (1989). 
281 Cowan, supra note 269, at 97; see also Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 
2018 UTAH L. REV. 307, 337 (2018) (proposing an Indian Sovereignty Affirmation Act).  
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Congress could exempt on-reservation transactions, and the parties participating in 
those transactions, from federal taxation; it could provide that states have no power 
to tax any person doing business in Indian country or any transaction occurring 
there; it could take away the tribes’ otherwise sovereign power to impose taxes; it 
could impose whatever regulatory restrictions on doing business that it thinks 
appropriate; and so on. Congress thus could make Indian country more attractive 
as a place for investment simply by clarifying the respective governments’ taxing 
powers.282 
 
But any congressional action is unlikely and subject to political pressures that would prevent this 
type of tribal tax preemption.283 After all, congressional leaders are unlikely to choose tribal 
interests over the interests of their state constituents.284  
 
3. Executive Branch Efforts 
 
Additionally, the executive branch has attempted to provide some certainty regarding 
leasing on Indian land. The BIA has promulgated regulations that provide explicit preemptory 
language to transactions involving leases of Indian land.285 25 C.F.R. § 167.017 provides: 
 
The Federal statutes and regulations governing leasing on Indian lands (as well as 
related statutes and regulations concerning business activities, including leases, by 
Indian traders) occupy and preempt the field of Indian leasing. The Federal 
statutory scheme for Indian leasing is comprehensive, and accordingly precludes 
State taxation. In addition, the Federal regulatory scheme is pervasive and leaves 
no room for State law. 
 
This regulatory language was mentioned in Seminole Tribe v. Stranburg, but the Eleventh Circuit 
stated that the Bracker balancing test requires a particularized factual inquiry and, as a result, the 
court did not defer to BIA’s regulation regarding the Florida tax at issue.286 Federal circuits that 
have addressed whether an agency’s preemption determination is entitled to Chevron deference 
unanimously hold that they are not.287 Thus, the BIA’s regulatory attempts to clarify implied 
 
282 Jensen, supra note 21, at 19.  
283 Jensen, supra note 21, at 19-20. Skibine, supra note 21, at 420-21 (criticizing congressional inaction and 
emphasizing the problem of judicial supremacy); Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 Years 
of Federal Indian Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy?, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277, 320-21 (2018). 
284 Carpenter, supra note 21, at 670.   
285 Bureau of Indian Affairs, Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Lands, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 72,440 (Dec. 5, 2012) (codified at 25 C.F.R. 162); see also, Willis supra note 269, at 12.  
286 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 576-77 (2009).  
287 Grosso v. Surface Trans. Bd., 804 F.3d 110, 116-17 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). 
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preemption in certain areas do not seem to effectuate any more certainty for the Bracker balancing 
test.288  
 
4. Abandoning Bracker, in Whole or in Part 
 
Finally, scholars have recommended replacing the Bracker balancing test. Some suggest 
reevaluating the Bracker balancing test’s role in federal Indian law.289 Others advocate abandoning 
the Bracker balancing test altogether.290 For example, one scholar argues that the Supreme Court 
should walk back its decision in Wagnon and apply the Bracker balancing test “irrespective of a 
tax’s legal incidence and notwithstanding whether a tax arises as a result of on-reservation or off-
reservation activity.”291 Another contends that abandoning Bracker in favor of the Williams v. Lee 
infringement test would be “a more administrable standard.”292 The infringement test, which is 
rooted in the Territory Clause, allows state action only to the extent that the action does not infringe 
on tribal self-governance. The infringement test continues to be an independent ground for 
invalidating state action, regardless of the Bracker balancing test.293  
However, recent cases like Bay Mills suggest that the Supreme Court is unlikely to abandon 
Bracker any time soon.294 In Bay Mills, the Court was asked to reexamine tribal sovereign 
immunity precedent set forth in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 
(1998).295 The Court declined the invitation to stray from Kiowa’s precedent, holding that (1) 
Kiowa came from a long line of precedent regarding tribal sovereign immunity, (2) the Supreme 
Court has subsequently relied on Kiowa, (3) “tribes across the country, as well as entities and 
individuals doing business with them, have for many years relied on Kiowa (along with its 
forebears and progeny), negotiating their contracts and structuring their transactions against a 
backdrop of tribal immunity,” and (4) Congress retains authority over tribal immunity and may 
alter the law whenever it deems appropriate.296  
 
288 Recently, President Biden signed an executive memorandum promoting tribal sovereignty. Joseph R. Biden, 
Memorandum on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening Nation-to-Nation Relationships, (Jan. 26, 2021) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum-on-tribal-consultation-
and-strengthening-nation-to-nation-relationships [https://perma.cc/D93A-D3TJ]. The extent to which this may 
impact state taxation of non-Indians on tribal lands is yet to be determined. For an examination of potential 
subdelegations of authority by the federal executive branch to tribes, see Samuel Lazerwitz, Sovereignty-Affirming 
Subdelegations: Recognizing the Executive’s Ability to Delegate Authority and Affirm Inherent Tribal Powers, 72 
STAN. L. REV. 1041 (2020).  
289 John Hayden Dossett, Indian Country and the Territory Clause: Washington’s Promise at the Framing, 68 AM. 
U. L. REV. 205, 207-08 (2018). 
290 Id. at 274-75. 
291 Martin, supra note 21, at 265-66. 
292 Dossett, supra note 289, at 274-75.  
293 But see Nathan Quigley, Defining the Contours of the Infringement Test Involving the State Taxation of Non-
Indians after Williams v. Lee, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 147 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court has diminished the 
infringement test). 
294 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014).  
295 Id. at 797-98.  
296 Id. at 798-99. 
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These four justifications for adhering to precedent clearly apply to the Bracker balancing 
test. First, Bracker fits within a long line of precedent regarding state taxation on tribal land. 
Second, the Supreme Court has relied on the Bracker balancing test for decades. Third, tribes, 
states, and business entities consider the Bracker balancing test when contracting and conducting 
their business on tribal lands.  And fourth, Congress undoubtedly wields the power to permit or 
restrict state taxation that is currently subject to a Bracker balancing analysis. Because the Supreme 
Court is extremely unlikely to abandon the Bracker balancing test, courts will continue to work 
within the Bracker framework.  
Although some extrajudicial solutions work to avoid the uncertainty of the Bracker 
balancing test and indeed have reaped mutually positive outcomes for tribes and the states,297 our 
focus and ultimate recommendations remain rooted within the current iteration of implied 
preemption under Bracker. Tribal-state compacts have limitations; Congress is unlikely to act; the 
executive branch lacks the authority to declare its regulations preemptory; and the Supreme Court 
is unlikely to abandon the Bracker balancing test. Accordingly, we provide suggestions for the 
Bracker balancing test regarding the issues of standing, economic burden, and preemptive force 




As set forth in Part IV, lower courts have diverged regarding the standing of a non-Indian 
litigant to present tribal interests in support of a Bracker balancing analysis. Courts in Arizona, 
Washington, and New Mexico have allowed non-Indians to present tribal interests for the Bracker 
balancing test, while courts in Montana and North Dakota have not.298 This issue was not before 
the Supreme Court in Bracker because the White Mountain Apache Tribe was a party to the suit.299 
To adequately conduct a Bracker balancing test, we argue that a non-Indian party must have 
standing to assert tribal interests.  
The Bracker balancing test requires a consideration of tribal interests when determining 
whether state authority may encompass a non-Indian’s activity on tribal lands.300 The Bracker 
court stated, “The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must 
 
297 For example, the conflict between the State of Washington and the Tulalip Tribes detailed in Part IV was 
tentatively settled through a revenue-sharing agreement instead of resolving in the Ninth Circuit. Jerry Cornfield, 
Deal ends legal fight and allows Tulalips a cut of sales tax, HERALDNET (Jan. 29, 2020) 
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/deal-ends-legal-fight-and-allows-tulalips-a-cut-of-sales-tax 
[https://perma.cc/NRA8-X9VW].  
298 Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State 
Dep’t of Rev., 432 P.3d 411, 423 n.12 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018); Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. Montana, 772 P.2d 
829, 835-36 (Mont. 1989); State ex rel. Poll v. Mont. Ninth Judicial Dist., 851 P.2d 405, 409-10 (Mont. 1993); 
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 n.2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Baker Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Public 
Serv. Comm’n, 451 N.W.2d 95, 98 (N.D. 1990).  
299 Likewise, tribes or their organizations were litigants in the key Supreme Court cases decided after Bracker. E.g., 
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 
U.S. 450, 453 (1995); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005). The litigant conducting 
business on the reservation in Cotton Petroleum did not assert the tribal interest. 
300 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1980). 
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inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation 
of federal law.”301 Courts are to consider the broad policies underlying tribal sovereignty.302 As a 
result, courts include tribal economic development and tribal sovereignty within this 
consideration.303  
The Bracker balancing test applies to a state assertion of authority over a non-Indian’s 
actions on tribal lands. When a court conducts a Bracker balancing test, it should weigh all of the 
competing factors at stake. Failing to take into account one third of the essential interests that a 
court is required to consider is undoubtedly contrary to the test’s origin and purpose. Requiring a 
tribe to become a litigant in order to permit another party to present the information necessary for 
a court to conduct a full Bracker analysis imports an additional burdensome prerequisite for the 
test. A complete analysis of the Bracker balancing test should not hinge on whether a tribe is a 
party to the litigation. Thus, courts should hold that non-Indians have standing to assert tribal 
interests for the purpose of the Bracker balancing test.  
 
C. Economic Burden  
 
 Unlike non-Indian standing, the variability regarding tribal economic burden began with 
the Supreme Court itself. Through Bracker, Ramah, and Cotton Petroleum, the Court has taken 
divergent paths when conducting a Bracker balancing analysis.304 And because more recent 
opinions do not disavow the reasoning of the previous ones, lower courts are presented with a 
range of precedents from which to draw to resolve an implied preemption issue.305 Regardless, the 
Court’s analysis in Cotton Petroleum supports the argument that tribal economic burden must be 
considered in the Bracker balancing test. 
We make two observations about Cotton Petroleum that support a full consideration of 
tribal economic burden. First, the Court emphasized the factual findings of the New Mexico 
District Court.306 The Court quoted the finding that “‘[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe by 
virtue of the state taxes.’”307 The Court also stated that the tribe could increase its own taxes 
without adversely affecting the development of its oil and gas production.308 
 
301 Id. at 143 (emphasis added). 
302 Id. at 143-44.  
303 Ramah, 458 U.S. at 838 (“[T]he traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, and the recognition and encouragement 
of this sovereignty in congressional Acts promoting tribal independence and economic development, inform the pre-
emption analysis that governs this inquiry.”); see e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 
457, 471 (2d Cir. 2013); Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev., 432 P.3d 411, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2018).  
304 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151 n.15; Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844; Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989). 
305 See also Jensen supra note 21, at 78 (“Economic burden mattered, in theory at least, even in [Cotton Petroleum] 
where the Court assumed that little or no such burden existed.”).  
306 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185.  
307 Id. at 185.  
308 Id. at 185.  
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Second, the Court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit Crow Tribe decision, which it 
summarily affirmed two years before Cotton Petroleum.309 There, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted after affording great weight to an economic 
study that found Montana’s taxes decreased tribal coal production, prevented the tribe’s coal from 
competing with other coal producers, and harmed the tribe’s economic development.310 The Cotton 
Petroleum Court distinguished Crow Tribe as “a case in which an unusually large state tax has 
imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.”311 The Court further noted that it would not reexamine 
its summary affirmance of Crow Tribe, that the taxes in Crow Tribe had a negative effect on the 
marketability of the coal, and according to the Tribe’s expert, the effective rate of the taxes were 
32.9 percent.312 Thus, full consideration of the tribal economic burden comports with even the 
least tribe-favorable precedence.  
To thoroughly conduct a fact-specific balancing test under Bracker, courts must examine 
the tribal economic burden. Cotton Petroleum acknowledges as much.313 When conducting this 
particularized inquiry, courts must consider the broad policies underlying tribal sovereignty, which 
includes tribal economic development.314 However, the Court in Cotton Petroleum also made clear 
that tribal economic burden is not necessarily determinative. This reasoning is consistent with 
footnote 15 in Bracker itself, noting that tribal economic burden alone will not determine 
preemption.315 Such a result makes sense. Bracker implied preemption is, after all, a balancing 
test.  
But the Court in Cotton Petroleum limited what considerations are included within the 
tribal economic burden.316 Some factors, like dual taxation and unsupported conceptions of lesser 
profits, do not appear to be within the tribal economic burden consideration.317 In Cotton 
Petroleum, the Court stated, “There is simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an 
adverse effect on the Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees.”318 This suggests that part of the 
tribal economic burden consideration includes whether a state tax adversely effects a tribe’s ability 
to attract business enterprises. Further, the Cotton Petroleum Court’s discussion of Crow Tribe 
suggests that the tribe’s ability to produce a good and the tribe’s ability to compete in the market 
for that good are considered within the tribal economic burden.319 Thus, although the Court in 
Cotton Petroleum and Ramah weighed the tribal economic burden, this consideration does not 
necessarily encompass every negative consequence that state taxation has on a tribe.320  
 
309 Id. at 186 n.17; Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988). 
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311 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186.  
312 Id. at 186 n.17. 
313 Id. at 185-86. 
314 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980). 
315 Id. at 151 n.15. 
316 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185, 191.  
317 Id. at 185-86. 
318 Id. at 191.  
319 Id. at 186 n.17. 
320 Id. at 186 (rejecting effects that were “too indirect and too insubstantial”). 
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 Lastly, we note that courts should rely on economic expert testimony to determine the tribal 
economic burden. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Cotton Petroleum when it relied 
on the district court’s factual findings regarding tribal economics that were based in large part on 
expert testimony.321 Although many lower courts in their Bracker test analysis relied on expert 
testimony in determining the tribal economic burden, some have afforded no weight to economic 
expert opinions without explanation.322  
 
D. The Preemptive Force of Specific Federal Regulations  
 
The judiciary can reduce disparate outcomes in the application of the Bracker balancing 
test if it changes the manner in which federal interests are considered in two respects. The first is 
by standardizing the weight afforded to the federal interest when similar enterprises are being 
taxed. The second is by adopting a rebuttable presumption against preemption when the area of 
regulation is one in which the states have traditionally legislated. 
Initially, we suggest a categorical standardized weight be assigned to the federal interest 
because this interest does not vary as to similar categories of enterprises. This contrasts with tribal 
and state interests which are likely to differ from case to case.323 The federal interest is defined by 
its statutes, administrative regulations, and the manner in which the United States Government 
administers these policies. Hence, for each category of Indian affairs supervised by the national 
government, the federal interest at stake is static. Accordingly, there is justification to assign the 
strength of the federal interest an equivalent weight in cases in which the state is attempting to tax 
the same types of enterprises. In other words, courts should deem the weight of the federal interest 
as a constant in the balancing equation when the same category of enterprise is the target of the 
challenged tax.  
In addition to standardizing the strength of the federal interest, we recommend that the 
courts apply a presumption that is used to analyze preemption in the context of federalism. The 
Supreme Court has promulgated the presumption that the state’s historic police powers are not to 
be superseded by federal law when there is an historic presence of state law in a given area of 
regulation.324 The incorporation of this principle into federal preemption analysis as to tribal 
 
321 See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 745 P.2d 1170, 1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). 
322Compare, Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 899-901 (9th Cir. 1987); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 
v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 473 (2d Cir. 2013); Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 1057 
(W.D. Wash. 2018) (all gave weight to expert testimony that state taxes imposed an economic burden on the tribe 
and its members) with Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011)(gave no weight to the 
economic expert’s testimony—which had been adopted by the district court—that state taxes imposed an economic 
burden on the tribe). 
323 The economic consequences of a tax on a tribe differs from project to project. Likewise, there is fluctuation 
between cases as to the amount of revenue a state generates from the tax imposed on a business located on the 
reservation. The cost of state services expended for the benefit of the tribe or its business partner varies, as well. 
324 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). The Supreme Court appeared to have abandoned the presumption against 
preemption before it decided Wyeth. See generally, Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 
2085 (2000). It appears that the doctrine “is part of the landscape of preemption jurisprudence, perhaps now more 
than at any time in recent memory.” Mary J. Davis, The New Presumption against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
1217, 1254 (2009). 
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interests provides a parsimonious lens through which to determine the strength of the federal 
interest if a thorough examination of the statutory and regulatory scheme does not clearly 
demonstrate that federal government’s policy is comprehensive and exclusive.  
To illustrate how these principles apply to likely scenarios, we examine the federal interest 
at stake in cases involving gaming enterprises operating on reservations. With the exception of 
Nevada and possibly New Jersey, states historically have not exercised their regulatory power in 
the realm of legal betting. Hence, the presumption against preemption would not apply. Congress 
enacted IGRA to create the opportunity for tribes to develop gaming within their reservations. 
IGRA recognizes a strong interest in promoting tribal self-government and tribal self-
sufficiency.325 It is comprehensive even though it grants states some role in the regulation of certain 
Indian gaming, requiring tribal-state compacts that regulate a tribe’s gaming activities.326 Although 
the IGRA does not clearly define the exact scope of state regulations, as the Supreme Court 
indicated in Cotton Petroleum, “ambiguities in federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal 
independence.”327 Thus, when the state attempts to impose a tax on gaming enterprises, the court 
should view the federal interest as substantial. This in turn imposes the burden on the state to 
demonstrate that it possesses an even stronger interest that is greater than the federal and tribal 
interests. In gaming cases, the federal interest should uniformly be considered significant.328 
Leasing of tribal property provides another example of how the federal interest may be 
characterized. The federal interest in tribal on-reservation leasing is defined by Section 5108 of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Long-Term Leasing Act, and the Leasing 
Regulations.329 Although a reasonable argument can be proffered that the federal regulation of 
Indian land and leasing of Indian land is extensive and comprehensive, the regulation of leaseholds 
traditionally has been the subject of state regulation with little federal oversight.330 The 
presumption of preemption would apply. Accordingly, the litigant challenging the imposition of 
the tax would have to overcome the presumption. The federal interest in this context thus should 




Forty years of applying the Bracker balancing test has produced inconsistent outcomes. 
After examining lower court decisions that conducted a Bracker balancing test, we concluded that 
 
325 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2010). 
326 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2010).  
327 490 U.S. at 177.  
328 Applying these principles in IGRA cases, the outcomes of Video Gaming Technologies, Inc and Flandreau 
Santee Sioux Tribe v. Noem would remain the same, but the outcome of Mashantucket Pequot would differ. 
329 25 U.S.C. § 5108; 25 U.S.C. §§ 415-416j; 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.001-703.  
330 Except for civil rights and national emergencies, landlord-tenant law is governed by state statutes and the 
common law rather than federal law. Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, Landlord-Tenant Law 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/landlord-tenant_law [https://perma.cc/S2L4-4SEP].  
331 In the leasing cases, the application of these principles would produce the same outcome in Stranburg and the 
opposite result in Herpel. 
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the test fails to provide clear guidance of its application. Our statistical analysis did not reveal any 
factors guiding lower court decisions, save for the two areas of law on which the Supreme Court 
has clearly ruled: cigarette and retail fuel taxes. To encourage lower courts to increase consistency, 
we suggested three ways to produce more predictable outcomes: (1) non-Indian litigants should 
have standing to argue the tribal interest prong, (2) courts should consider the tribal economic 
burden as presented through expert testimony, and (3) courts should standardize the weight 
afforded to the federal interest when the similar enterprises are being taxed and adopt a rebuttable 
presumption against preemption when the area of regulation is one in which the states have 
traditionally legislated.  
In May 2020, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari filed 
in Noem v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe thereby declining the opportunity to reevaluate the 
Bracker balancing test in the context of taxation of gaming on tribal lands.332 In July 2020, Chief 
Justice Roberts criticized Bracker in his dissent in McGirt v. Oklahoma, recognizing the test’s 
uncertainty and the resulting litigious consequences.333 Compounding Chief Justice Roberts’s 
McGirt dissent was the October 2020 denial of certiorari for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Video 
Gaming Technologies decision.334 The opposite holdings of the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the 
Second Circuit in nearly identical factual situations presented a straightforward opportunity to 
clarify the Bracker balancing test.335 But with the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas correctly 
concluded that “pre-emption law will remain amorphous.”336 Unless the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari of a case applying the Bracker balancing test, lower courts will continue to inconsistently 
apply this currently unworkable test to the detriment of states, tribes, and interested third parties. 
Until then, the Bracker balancing test for implied preemption will continue to fall short as a 
predictable judicial resolution for state taxation in Indian lands.  
 
332 Noem v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 140 S.Ct. 2804 (2020). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and 
Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009). Although the 
case presented an opportunity to clarify certain aspects of the Bracker balancing test, the Flandreau Santee Sioux 
Tribe welcomed the denial. Securing Victory for Tribes in Landmark Tax Case, PEEBLES KIDDER (May 27, 2020), 
http://www.ndnlaw.com/securing-victory-for-tribes-in-landmark-tax-case.php.   
333 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
334 Rogers Cty. Bd. v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 141 S.Ct. 24, 24 (2020).  





APPENDIX A. Dataset - 64 Cases* 
*Duplicate cases are labeled A and B, and the triplicate set of cases is labeled A, B, and C. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Date Case Name & Citation Tax Outcome 
08/25/1980 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O’Cheskey, 625 F.2d 
967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 
(1982) 
gross receipts not 
preempted 
10/10/1980 A: Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 
632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980) 
income preempted 
10/10/1980 B: Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 




07/13/1981 Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 
(9th Cir. 1981) (Crow I), amended 665 F.2d 1390 






06/16/1983 Board of Equalization v. Alaska Native Bhd. and 
Sisterhood, Camp No. 14, 666 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 
1983) 
ad valorem not 
preempted 
07/6/1984 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 590 F. Supp. 198 





09/5/1984 Marty Indian Sch. v. South Dakota, 592 F. Supp. 
1236 (D. S.D. 1984) 
sales preempted 
01/24/1986 Sqauxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 
715 (9th Cir. 1986) 
liquor sales not 
preempted 
09/26/1986 Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd., 
800 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1986) 
cigarette not 
preempted 
06/11/1987 Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 
(9th Cir. 1987) (Crow II) summarily aff'd 484 






07/31/1987 Marty Indian Sch. Bd., Inc. v. South Dakota, 824 
F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1987) 
fuel (MFT) preempted 
09/17/1987 Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 106 N.M. 517 
(App. 1987) 
oil & gas not 
preempted 
09/22/1987 Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Okla. Tax 
Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987) 
sales preempted 
05/10/1988 Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094 







08/10/1988 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v. 
Revenue Div. of Dep’t of Taxation and Revenue, 
759 P.2d 186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) 
gross receipts not 
preempted 
04/20/1989 Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. Montana, 772 











09/24/1991 Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Dillon, 826 P.2d 1186 






06/23/1992 Anderson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 484 
N.W.2d 914 (Wis. 1992) 
income not 
preempted 
06/26/1992 Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 967 F.2d 




10/6/1992 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 729 P.2d 1243 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) 
gross receipts preempted 
10/18/1994 Blaze Const. Co., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue 
Dep’t, 884 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1994) 
gross receipts not 
preempted 
10/27/1994 Fatt v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 884 P.2d 1233 
(Utah 1994) 
income preempted 
01/5/1995 Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. M. Greenberg 





03/21/1995 Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. 
Arizona, 50 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995) 
sales not 
preempted 
09/14/1995 A Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d 
662 (Utah 1995)  
income preempted 
09/14/1995 B Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d 
662 (Utah 1995)  
income not 
preempted 
07/31/1996 Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 91 F.3d 
1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (Gila River I) 
sales not 
preempted 
01/9/1997 Pimalco, Inc. v. Maricopa Cty., 937 P.2d 1198 





06/30/1997 Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F.3d 






01/22/1998 Loveness v. Ariz. Dep’t of Rev., 963 P.2d 303 





03/4/1999 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. New Mexico 
Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 977 P.2d 1021 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1999) 
gasoline preempted 




02/13/2001 LaRock v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 621 





06/8/2001 Goodman Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 28 
P.3d 996 (Idaho 2001) 
fuel preempted 
08/14/2003 Luther Const. Co., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Rev., 74 




08/15/2003 Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Ketchikan Indian 
Corp., 75 P.3d 1042 (Alaska 2003) 
ad valorem not 
preempted 






08/19/2004 Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674 
(9th Cir. 2004) 
fuel (MFT) preempted 
02/3/2006 Squaxin Island Tribe v. Stephens, 2006 WL 




05/24/2006 Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 





02/5/2007 Winnebago Tribe v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892 (Kan. 
2007) 
fuel (MFT) preempted 
6/18/2008 Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 
1184 (9th Cir. 2008) 
sales   not 
preempted 
01/4/2010 Confederated Tribes and Band of the Yakama 
Nation v. Gregoire, 680 F.Supp.2d 1258 (E.D. 
Wash. 2010) 
cigarette tax not 
preempted 
10/14/2010 Seneca Nation of Indians v. Paterson, 2010 WL 
4027796 (W.D. N.Y. 2010) 
cigarette sales not 
preempted 
05/9/2011 Oneida Nation v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 
2011) 
cigarette sales not 
preempted 
07/27/2011 Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 
1177 (10th Cir. 2011) 




02/28/2012 Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 





07/15/2013 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 






07/30/2013 Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. 
Thurston County Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 




08/26/2015 A Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015)  
rental preempted 
08/26/2015 B Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015)  
utility not 
preempted 






10/4/2018 A Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 
1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018) 




10/4/2018 B Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 







10/4/2018 C Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 





12/11/2018 Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of 





01/28/2019 Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 












08/13/2019 Big Sandy Rancheria Enterprises v. Becerra, 395 





09/6/2019 Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Haeder, 938 
F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2019) 
gross receipts not 
preempted 
09/6/2019 Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Noem, 938 F.3d 
928 (8th Cir. 2019) 
use preempted 
12/17/2019 Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Rogers Cty. Bd. of 




02/10/2020 Herpel v. County of Riverside, 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 










APPENDIX B. Median 1999 Household Income for Tribes in 64 Case Dataset  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Tribes in each case     Median 2000 household income  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Mashantucket Pequot  $60,132 
Agua Caliente $41,131 
Flandreau Santee Sioux $37,500 
Chemehuevi $35,750 
Squaxin Island $35,750 
Squaxin Island & Swinomish $35,732 
Menominee & Oneida $33,886 
Yavapai-Prescott $33,750 
Oneida of New York, Seneca Nation, Unkechauge, & Mohawk $32,859 
Coeur d'Alene $32,847 
Tulalip Tribes $32,045 
Puyallup Tribe of Washington $31,728 
Chehalis  $31,250 
Seneca Nation & Cayuga $30,572 
Salt River Pima-Maricopa $30,450 
Yakama $30,338 
Seminole Tribe $30,313 
Lake Superior Chippewa $30,234 
381 
 
Coeur D’Alene, Nez Perce, & Shoshone-Bannock $29,366 
Sac & Fox, Iowa, & Kickapoo   $29,167 
Cherokee Nation $28,791 
Cherokee $28,658 
Hoopa Valley Tribe $28,657 
Muscogee Creek $28,390 
Unknown (average of medians) $28,502 
Mission  $27,885 
Ketchikan $27,768 
Jicarilla Apache, Navajo, Laguna Pueblo, & Zia Pueblo $27,572 
Navajo (Utah) $26,787 
Jicarilla Apache $26,667 
Gila River $26,339 
Crow $25,344 
Alturas Indian Ranchera & Karuk  $25,016 
Wiyot Band of Indians $24,910 
Western Mono  $24,750 
Navajo (Arizona) & Hoppi $24,433 
Navajo (Arizona) $22,647 
Mescalero  $22,447 
Navajo (New Mexico) $21,830 
Winnebago of Nebraska $21,705 




Yankton Sioux   $20,409 
Ute Mountain   $19,390 
White Mountain Apache $17,227 
Narragansett $16,094 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
